

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



# Bulletin

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THE  
OFFICIAL  
WEEKLY RECORD

UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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February 1, 1960

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## United States Participates in Economic Talks at Paris

*Under Secretary Douglas Dillon left Washington for Paris on January 10 to represent the United States at a meeting of a Special Economic Committee on January 12 and 13,<sup>1</sup> a meeting of the 20 governments which are members or associates of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation on January 14,<sup>2</sup> and a ministerial meeting of the OEEC Council, also on January 14. Following is a series of statements made by Mr. Dillon, together with the texts of three resolutions adopted by the Special Economic Committee on January 13 and subsequently by the 20 member countries and associates of the OEEC on January 14.*

### DEPARTURE STATEMENT, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 10

Press release 5 dated January 9

My trip to Paris has two purposes:

On January 12 and 13 I will attend a meeting of representatives of a number of governments and the European Economic Commission. This meeting was called in accordance with an understanding reached by President Eisenhower, President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan, and Chancellor Adenauer at their conference in Paris on December 21.<sup>3</sup>

On January 14 I will represent the United States at the ministerial meeting of the Council of the OEEC.

It will be our purpose on January 12 and 13 to consider the need for and possible methods of continuing consultation on the important problems of expanding liberal multilateral world trade and stimulating aid to the less developed countries of the free world. These are complex and difficult problems. We do not expect to solve them during the course of the next week, nor do

we plan to make decisions affecting other countries without full consultation with them. But it is my hope that we will be able to decide upon practical steps which might be taken to devise the means most suitable for close consultation on these subjects.

The OEEC Council and the Executive Secretary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade will be fully informed of the discussions held on January 12 and 13.

Since the end of the Second World War the free nations of the world have made tremendous progress in devising entirely new concepts and new means of cooperation with each other. I am confident that the spirit of cooperation which has made possible the accomplishments of the past will serve us equally well in dealing with the challenges of the future.

<sup>1</sup> The governments and organizations represented at the meeting on Jan. 12 and 13 were:

Belgium	Netherlands
Canada	Portugal
Denmark	Sweden
France	Switzerland
Germany	United Kingdom
Greece	United States
Italy	EEC Commission

<sup>2</sup> The member countries of the OEEC and associates represented at the meeting on Jan. 14 were:

Austria	Netherlands
Belgium	Norway
Denmark	Portugal
France	Spain
Germany	Sweden
Greece	Switzerland
Iceland	Turkey
Ireland	United Kingdom
Italy	Canada (associate)
Luxembourg	United States (associate)

<sup>3</sup> For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of Jan. 11, 1960, p. 43.

## ARRIVAL STATEMENT, PARIS, JANUARY 11

During my last visit to Europe in early December,<sup>4</sup> I had a most welcome opportunity to discuss informally with a number of my European friends and colleagues matters relating to certain trade problems and the challenge facing the industrialized nations of the free world to assist the less developed countries.

Since then, President Eisenhower, President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan, and Chancellor Adenauer have proposed an informal meeting to consider the need and possible methods for continuing close consultation on these problems. I look forward to representing the United States at that meeting, which has been called for January 12 and 13.

Immediately thereafter, on January 14, I will also represent the United States at the ministerial meeting of the OEEC Council. This will provide an opportunity for the participants in the January 12-13 meeting to inform the entire OEEC of their discussions.

It seems to me that we now face two tasks. The first is to consider immediate steps to have early informal consultations on the trade problems I have spoken of and also on development assistance. Our second task is to consider a long-range plan for continuing international consultations in the future.

We now seek constructive solutions to new challenges facing us today. As we do so, I am confident that the same spirit of cooperation which has made possible the extraordinary economic progress of the 1950's will serve us equally in the decade ahead.

## SPECIAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, PARIS, JANUARY 12

Press release 13 dated January 14

I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the Special Economic Committee for this opportunity to present the views of the United States regarding the major tasks to which my Government hopes this Committee will address

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Dillon was in Europe Dec. 7-14; for an announcement of his itinerary, see BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1959, p. 862.

itself in the limited time at its disposal today and tomorrow.

I will begin by discussing the background of the communique which was issued on December 21 following the close of the recent Western summit meeting and from which we draw our terms of reference. Then I would like to lay before the Committee for its consideration certain procedural suggestions for future work.

There is no need for me to repeat the text of the communique of December 21. The essence of it is that we are invited to consider procedures designed to insure that three important economic questions will be given prompt and serious international attention.

The first of these questions relates to the commercial policies of the members of the European Economic Community [EEC] and of the proposed European Free Trade Association [EFTA]<sup>5</sup> with respect to trade with other countries, including their trade with each other.

The second is that of enlarging the flow of development capital from the industrialized free world to the less developed areas.

The third is the problem of finding the best mechanism for continuing international consultations on major economic problems, including the problem of development assistance.

You are all of course aware that the communique of December 21 was based upon a proposal put forward by the United States. This proposal of ours was formulated in the light of discussions in recent weeks between the Government of the United States and several European governments. President Eisenhower had occasion to discuss certain of these matters during his recent trip, first in Rome and later in Paris. I also discussed them with the representatives of several governments and with the Commission of the European Economic Community in the course of my recent visit to London, Brussels, Bonn, and Paris, as did Assistant Secretary of the Treasury [T. Graydon] Upton on an earlier trip.

As a result of these talks my Government came to the following conclusions.

<sup>5</sup> The EEC, sometimes called the "Inner Six," is composed of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The EFTA, sometimes called the "Outer Seven," is composed of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

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### Question of European Trade

First, we concluded that the trade problems now emerging in Western Europe presented certain dangers. On the one hand was the danger that these trade problems could lead to political and economic frictions within Europe which might weaken the cohesion of the free world. On the other was the danger that, in an effort to solve the regional European trade problem, measures might be taken which could seriously impair the worldwide trading principles established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

These dangers, political and economic, are not ones which the United States can safely ignore. To mention only the economic aspect, it is clear that the development of United States commercial policy cannot be divorced from developments in such an important area of world trade as Western Europe. All would agree, I think, that the pursuit of a liberal commercial policy by the United States is essential to the functioning of an effective world trading system. United States commercial policy, however, is not formed in a vacuum. It can be kept liberal only insofar as other major trading countries also pursue liberal policies. Viewing the matter in both its political and economic aspects, we believe that the European trade question is an urgent one and requires the earliest possible attention. The history of this problem makes clear that there is no easy solution readily at hand. It is likely therefore that this subject will require continuing consultations.

### Question of Enlarged Development Assistance

The second conclusion to which we came as a result of our talks was that there is great awareness in Western Europe of the increasing role which Europe is bound to play in the provision of development assistance to the newly developing areas of the free world and that there exists a desire for cooperation with the United States and other capital-exporting nations in this common endeavor which is so vital to the preservation of freedom.

At the same time, many questions have been raised as to the best methods of mobilizing national resources for development assistance and of bringing about a more effective exchange of views and experience among the capital-exporting

nations which have the capacity to provide these resources.

The problem of development assistance—like that of the trade problem to which I have referred—is also one in which the United States has a deep interest because of its substantial activities in this field. We wish to work closely with Western Europe and Canada in an endeavor to provide the external development capital which the developing areas of the free world must have if their own efforts to achieve economic progress under conditions of freedom are to succeed.

### Question of Successor to OEEC

The third conclusion to which I came as a result of our discussions was that there was need for improving the machinery of international economic cooperation so as to create a better mechanism for dealing with major economic issues with a strengthened relationship between the United States and the other countries concerned. With this in view we felt that study should be given to revitalizing and broadening the work of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation through the establishment of a successor organization in which the United States could become a full member.

The OEEC has succeeded outstandingly in its major tasks of furthering the recovery of Western Europe. Even though many of the tasks for which it was originally created have now been largely accomplished, the OEEC is continuing to do valuable work. The habits of cooperation which have been developed through its efforts should be maintained and strengthened. For the new challenges which have emerged require the closest cooperation by all of us. For its part the United States is prepared to play a full and active part in such an effort.

Looking to the years ahead we see two main economic objectives which will require continuing attention. These are (1) the objective of promoting the economic development of the less developed areas, through bilateral methods as well as through the multilateral institutions already existing or about to be created; and (2) the objective of assuring stability and growth in the world economy.

Let me make one thing clear. If, as a result of this week's meetings, a study is undertaken of the methods of improving cooperation in the economic

field, we feel that such a study should not affect the good work presently under way in the OEEC. This should continue as at present. If, as a result of the proposed studies, it should later be determined by the member countries of the OEEC that a successor organization would be desirable, then and only then would it be time to transform the operations of the OEEC so as to adapt them to the requirements of the successor organization.

These, then, were the substantive conclusions which emerged from our consideration of current economic problems following our discussions with several European governments.

#### **Need for International Action on Economic Problems**

The three economic questions which I have mentioned—the question of European trade, the question of enlarged development assistance, and the question of a successor organization to the OEEC—are in many respects separate questions. Yet these three questions have one thing in common, which is that there is no existing international institution through which they may be successfully attacked.

The urgent question of European trade is not being discussed in the OEEC, partly for historical reasons with which all of the members of this Committee are familiar. Nor, because of aspects which go beyond the realm of commercial policy, can it be discussed effectively in the large forum of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In our judgment this question can only be addressed with any prospect of progress in a limited but representative group such as this Committee.

The question of coordination of broad national policies relating to worldwide development assistance would appear to require the full participation of all countries actively engaged in this effort. The OEEC as presently constituted is seriously handicapped in this effort since the United States is not a full member. And, while the World Bank can be helpful in providing many kinds of information and in bringing countries together on specific projects in which the Bank has an interest, it is itself a lending institution which is not organized in such a way as to make possible the international discussion of broad policies, including national lending policies and the programs of those members which provide, or desire to provide,

external capital for development on a bilateral basis over and above their contribution to international organizations.

Finally, the question of whether there should be a successor organization to the OEEC, which would continue existing functions of the OEEC, which would add important new functions, and which would allow the United States and, we hope, Canada to assume the role of full members, can, in our view, only be discussed directly by all the governments concerned outside the framework of the institutional structure of the OEEC.

It was against this background, Mr. Chairman, that we proposed, at the time of the Western summit meeting, the creation of this Committee to formulate appropriate procedures to further international consideration of the three major economic problems to which I have referred.

#### **U.S. Offers Procedural Suggestions**

Since the publication of the communique of December 21 and the issuance by the French Government of the invitation to participate in the Special Economic Committee, my Government has been in continuing consultation both with the governments represented here and with other governments regarding the work of this Committee. In the light of these consultations I would like to place before the Committee the following procedural suggestions: first, for studying the desirability of a successor organization to the OEEC; second, for discussing, pending the establishment of such a successor organization, the problems of development assistance to the less developed areas; and, third, for giving early attention to the European trade questions.

#### *Committee To Study OEEC Reorganization*

In considering the desirability of a successor organization to the OEEC I think you will all agree that any such decision can only be taken by the 20 governments who are members of or associated with the OEEC. Furthermore all these governments must have adequate opportunity to thoroughly consider the matter so that we may all be certain that we are obtaining the best possible mechanism for handling the important economic problems which will face us in the future. Accordingly we would suggest that this matter be

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thoroughly considered and discussed at a meeting of senior officials representing the 20 governments. The efforts of such a group would be greatly facilitated by the preparation of adequate working papers. These could best be prepared by a very small group. It is our view that this preparatory working group should consist of not more than three persons: one of whom might be chosen from the EFTA countries, the second from the EEC countries, and the third from the other countries who are members of or associated with the OEEC. Once chosen, this Committee of Three would be expected to obtain the views of each of the 20 governments and to prepare a report for submission to the 20 governments. This report might outline the general problems to be faced and might include a draft charter. These documents could then serve as the initial working documents for the conference of officials to which I have referred.

If, as a result of the conference of officials, general agreement emerged on the desirability of a successor organization, a ministerial meeting could be convened to decide any remaining points at issue and to approve a new charter, which would then be submitted to governments for ratification.

It would be our thought that, if the Special Economic Committee agrees on a procedure such as I have outlined relating to the establishment of a successor organization to the OEEC, the Committee should recommend it to all of the 20 governments of the OEEC, whose representatives will be assembled on the occasion of the meeting of the OEEC Council on January 14.

The procedure I have outlined is designed to give every member country of the OEEC full opportunity to participate in this work from the beginning. We have been aware during the weeks following the communique of December 21 that many countries were uncertain as to what the United States had in mind in proposing consideration of a new mechanism of consultation to follow the OEEC. We have heard, on the one hand, that our objective was to weaken the EFTA, on the other, to weaken the EEC, and, finally, that we might be desirous of establishing some sort of directorate to make decisions for others.

Let me state clearly what our motivation actually was. It was very simple. We felt that the time had come when the new problems facing the world, particularly the necessity of marshaling

the total economic resources of the free world in the most effective manner to meet the challenge posed by the newly developing countries, required a close and fully equal collaboration between the United States and the now completely recovered countries of Western Europe. The creation of a new organization seemed unthinkable. It was only natural to explore the possibilities of combining everything that is best in the OEEC with a changed framework that would permit full and equal United States participation. We recognize that the OEEC performs and should continue to perform certain functions that are purely European in character and in which our participation would not be appropriate. We would hope that all such activities as are found to be of continuing usefulness by the members would continue on a purely European basis unaffected by our assumption of full membership in a new parent body.

#### *Development Assistance Group*

Now as to the problem of development assistance and its better coordination. If the study of the successor organization to the OEEC results in general agreement that such an organization should be established, we assume that it may be as long as 18 months before the new organization could come into being. We therefore propose that in the meantime a limited group be constituted consisting of those countries in a position to make an effective long-term bilateral contribution to the flow of funds to the less developed countries. We believe that this group on development assistance should operate in an informal manner and that it should consult, whenever desirable, with the World Bank, the OEEC, and other appropriate national or international institutions. A major task of the development assistance group would be to discuss the most effective methods of mobilizing national resources for development assistance as well as of providing such assistance to recipient countries in the most useful manner. There is not only a real need for an increased flow of long-term private and public funds from the industrial countries whose reserves have increased in recent years but also a real need to provide investments, loans, and assistance to the less developed countries in ways which will make the maximum constructive contribution to their economies. The United States would be prepared to make available to this group information on its own lending,



assistance, and investment guaranty operations with the thought that our experience might be useful to others in considering their own programs.

We do not envisage that the development assistance group should attempt to engage in a "burden sharing" exercise or seek to reach decisions on amounts of assistance to be provided to specific countries or areas. If, during its deliberations, it appears that two or more countries desire to cooperate in assistance to particular countries, then it would be desirable to consult promptly with the recipient country or perhaps enlist the good offices of the World Bank. This, as you know, has been the procedure followed successfully by a number of capital-exporting nations and the World Bank in coordinating assistance to India.

We believe that the development assistance group would not require any special international staff. It could, however, make effective use of certain studies which might be carried out by the staff of the OEEC. Useful studies which the OEEC might appropriately undertake at this time would be:

(a) The development of up-to-date statistics on the actual amount of financing which various countries have undertaken in their transactions with the less developed countries, as well as the various types of financing, the relative maturities, and the countries to which assistance has gone.

(b) A factual survey of existing national organizations in the investment, lending, and assistance field through which funds are made available to the less developed countries, the policies of these organizations, the funds currently available to them, and the source of the funds.

(c) An analysis of the various types of incentives to foreign investment in the less developed countries which may exist or be under consideration in the industrial countries.

These studies, as you will have observed, correspond in general with certain of the recommendations of the OEEC staff, which are to be considered at the meeting of the OEEC Council on January 14. Certain other recommendations of the OEEC staff in the field of development assistance would, in our judgment, be premature, and we will speak to that point at the January 14 meeting.

We propose that the development assistance

group consist of those of us who, in addition to their contributions in multilateral organizations, now make, or might be prepared to make, significant bilateral contributions to development. Such a group might include, for example, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Commission of the European Economic Community.

#### *Continuation of Special Economic Committee*

The third and last procedural proposal which we wish to put forward is that there be agreement on the forum in which the European trade questions referred to in the communique of December 21 could be discussed from time to time, pending the decision on a successor organization to OEEC.

We suggest that this Special Economic Committee should be continued for this purpose. Although we have heard various alternative suggestions regarding the composition of an appropriate group, we are inclined to doubt that a better formula can be found. In any case, the problems to be considered are of such potential seriousness and urgency that they should not be put aside pending the possible creation of a new organization, which probably could not take place for some 18 months. If agreement can be reached that this body is appropriate for this purpose, we would hope that the date and place for its first meeting could be agreed upon at this time. We believe that this first meeting should be held soon and should be attended by senior officials, with ministerial meetings to be called thereafter as necessary.

The group to deal with these trade questions would not, of course, affect the continuing work of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the Steering Board for Trade of the OEEC.

This completes the presentation of our views, Mr. Chairman. In order to facilitate consideration by the Committee of the procedural suggestions we have made, we have prepared drafts of the formal actions which the Committee might take on each of the three procedural arrangements—the study of the reorganization of the OEEC, the establishment of the development assistance group and its terms of reference, and the continuation of the Special Committee to discuss the trade problem. These drafts are being

circulated for the consideration of the members of the Committee.

#### **MEETING OF 20 GOVERNMENTS, PARIS, JANUARY 14**

Press release 19 dated January 15

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity to comment on the excellent report by the distinguished chairman of the Special Economic Committee, Mr. [Joseph M. A. H.] Luns. He has most ably summarized the outcome of our meeting yesterday. I am glad that he stressed—and I myself wish to underline—the fact that all of us who participated in the informal meetings fully recognized the interest of all member countries of the OEEC, as well as the two associate members, in this matter. I trust the full report which has just been made will reassure all the governments represented here today that there was no intention on the part of any of us—and this has certainly been the case so far as my own Government is concerned—to proceed further without full consultation with all OEEC governments.

Arrangements were made, I know, for all of you to receive copies of my remarks Tuesday evening at the opening meeting of the Special Economic Committee. Therefore I believe it is unnecessary for me to comment at any length on the reasons which prompted the proposals my Government has put forward. The essence of the United States position is that there are new challenges and new opportunities facing the free world. A greater degree of effective collaboration is needed to insure that we will be successful in meeting the new situation.

The objective of my Government in these discussions has been to reach agreement on an orderly method of beginning an exploration of three distinct problems: first, the question of trade which has arisen here in Europe but whose ramifications are truly worldwide in scope; second, the question of how to mobilize economic resources more effectively to promote the economic development of less developed areas; and, third, the need for new methods of economic cooperation which will promote stability and growth in the world economy.

All 20 governments represented here today must obviously participate from the very beginning in work relating to the question of organiza-

tional arrangements. I am sure that you will find that this is fully provided for in the resolution recommended by the Special Committee.

In concluding my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I should like to emphasize one point to which my Government attaches particular importance. That is the necessity that the good work of the OEEC continue unchanged during this period when we will be considering the possibilities for improved cooperation. We favor the formation of a reconstituted organization adapted to the needs of today. Subject to the approval of our Congress, the United States would be prepared to assume full and active membership in an appropriately reconstituted organization. In the meantime we are confident that the OEEC will proceed vigorously and creatively with the significant work before it.

#### **ARRIVAL STATEMENT, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 16**

Press release 22 dated January 16

I have just returned from Paris, where I represented the United States at the regular ministerial meeting of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and also at special meetings of the 20 governments which are members or associates of the OEEC.

At these special meetings the 20 governments reached decisions which are of great potential importance for the future of economic cooperation in the free world. Agreement was reached to work together for the establishment of a successor organization to the OEEC in which the United States could participate as a full member and which would facilitate cooperation between the industrialized nations of the free world in meeting the major economic problems which will face the world during the coming decade.

As a result of the Paris decisions we also have reason to expect that a serious and successful effort will now be made to solve the problems of European trade connected with the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association—the Six and the Seven. We have obtained assurances that any solution will take full account of the interests of the United States and other countries in accordance with the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.



Also during the Paris meetings the governments of a number of capital-exporting nations agreed to consult together on their efforts to provide development assistance to the less developed areas. This group will probably hold its first meeting in Washington in the near future.

## TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Press release 20 dated January 15

### Resolution on Study of O.E.E.C. Reorganization

Representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States and the Representative of the Commission of the European Economic Community,

a) *Fully appreciating* the cooperative work accomplished by the O.E.E.C.;

b) *Wishing* to ensure the continuity of cooperation in the fields where no change is called for;

c) Determined to pursue economic policies which will contribute to stability and growth in the world economy, *including trade policies directed to the sound use of economic resources and the maintenance of harmonious international relations*;

d) Conscious of the need to devote increased efforts towards furthering the development of less-developed countries;

e) Recognizing the importance of continued cooperation to ensure the achievement of these objectives;

f) Noting the desirability of arrangements which would enable full participation not only by the present 18 Members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation but also by the two associate members, the United States and Canada;

g) Desiring to proceed with an examination of improved organizational arrangements which could best accomplish these purposes;

h) Recognizing the equal interest of all member and associate member governments of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in this matter;

#### Propose

1) That a meeting of senior officials of the twenty Governments, members or associate members of the O.E.E.C. and to which the European Communities should also be invited, be convened in Paris on April 19, 1960 to consider the question of appropriate arrangements to achieve the objectives stated above;

2) That, in order to facilitate the work of such meeting, a group of four persons consisting of ..... and .....<sup>a</sup> should be appointed to prepare a report which would

a) examine the most effective methods for achieving

<sup>a</sup> Although tentatively selected, the names of members of the group of four will be officially announced later.

the objectives referred to above and make appropriate recommendations with respect thereto;

b) submit a draft of articles of agreement, should their examination of this question indicate the desirability of bringing about an appropriately improved organization for economic cooperation;

c) identify those functions at present performed by the O.E.E.C. which should continue to be the subject of international economic cooperation under the aegis of the proposed organizational arrangements with respect thereto;

3) That the group named above should consult with all twenty governments and the European Communities and appropriate international organizations during the preparation of their report without, however, committing any government as to the content of the report which would be submitted by them in their personal capacities and which would be open for discussion and negotiation at the meeting envisaged in Paragraph 1 above.

### Resolution on Development Assistance

#### *The Special Economic Committee*

*Having been informed* of the desire of the Governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the Commission of the European Economic Community, who, in addition to their contribution to international organizations, are making available or may be in a position to make available a significant flow of long term funds to underdeveloped areas, to discuss among themselves the question of techniques to facilitate such flow of funds, taking into consideration other means of assistance to developing countries;

*Notes* that these eight Governments and the Commission of the European Economic Community intend to meet together to discuss various aspects of cooperation in their efforts, and to invite other additional capital exporting countries to participate in their work or to meet with them as may from time to time appear desirable, and to consult with such multilateral organizations as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank.

### Resolution on Certain Trade Problems

#### *The Special Economic Committee*

*Recognizing* that there are problems of commercial policy of particular concern to the twenty governments who are members of, or associated with, the O.E.E.C.;

*Taking note* of the existence of the E.E.C. and of the convention for an E.F.T.A.;

*Bearing in mind* the relationship between the provisions of these agreements and general international commercial policy,

*Considering* the need to examine, as a matter of priority, the relationship between the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A. with due regard to the commercial interests of third countries and the principles and obligations of the G.A.T.T.;

#### *Decides*

to propose to the twenty governments that they consti-

tute themselves, together with the E.E.C., a committee with power to

1) establish one or more informal working groups for the consideration of these problems without infringing the competence of the existing international institutions such as the G.A.T.T. or the O.E.E.C.; these groups should report back to the Committee;

2) transmit an invitation to the Executive Secretary of the G.A.T.T. to participate in these discussions.

## President's Visit to Soviet Union Set for June 10-19

White House press release dated January 17

As already announced earlier,<sup>1</sup> the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev, invited the President of the United States to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union at a time suitable for him. President Eisenhower accepted with pleasure the invitation of N. S. Khrushchev.

As a result of subsequent personal exchanges between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, N. S. Khrushchev, and President Eisenhower, it was agreed that the President would make his visit in the Soviet Union from the 10th until the 19th of June 1960.

## U.S. Comments on Soviet Proposal To Reduce Armed Forces

*Statement by Lincoln White  
Director, Office of News*<sup>2</sup>

We note with interest the Soviet Union's announcement of an approximate 1.2-million-men proposed reduction in its conventional armed forces and a readjustment in its conventional armaments. We also note that these reductions are to be carried out within the next 1 to 2 years. This proposed action to reduce present massive Soviet armed forces could lessen one of the causes of existing world tensions. The announcement was not unexpected, since the Soviet Union, along with other modern nations, is now in a position to place greater reliance on new weapons.

In this connection Chairman Khrushchev has

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 12, 1959, p. 499.

<sup>2</sup> Made to news correspondents on Jan. 14.

emphasized that the proposed reductions would in no way affect the actual power of the Soviet Union's arms. The Soviet Union, with its acknowledged—I might say parenthetically for the first time—its acknowledged armed force level of 3.6 million, and its neighbor, Communist China, maintain the largest standing armies in the world. This fact has been a constant source of concern to those nations earnestly seeking a solution to the dangers inherent in the armaments race.

For its part the United States, not in 1960 but immediately following World War II, demobilized the great bulk of its armed forces from a peak level of 12.3 million. In view of Communist aggression the level was later raised and stands today at approximately 2.5 million. In addition the United States has carried out corresponding reductions in its conventional armaments.

As in the case of previous unilateral Soviet announcements, the proposed reductions can be taken only as an intention since there will be no verifiable means of checking any actual reductions. An opportunity to achieve controlled international measures of disarmament will be offered at the general disarmament negotiations scheduled for the early part of this year.<sup>3</sup> At these negotiations the United States will be prepared to go as far toward safeguarded disarmament as any other country. It is hoped that this announcement by the Soviet Union is an indication of its willingness to participate in the forthcoming negotiations in the same spirit so that world accord can be established through concrete and verifiable measures of disarmament, thereby removing suspicions and building real security.

## Letters of Credence

### *Bulgaria*

The newly appointed Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Peter G. Voutov, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on January 15. For texts of the Minister's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 17 dated January 15.

<sup>3</sup> For a communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States at Paris on Dec. 21, see BULLETIN of Jan. 11, 1960, p. 45.

## Geographic Regions of Asia: South and East

by G. Etzel Percy

A zone arcing around the southern and eastern peripheries of the Asian Continent from the Makran coast of West Pakistan to Peter the Great Bay in Maritime Siberia coincides with the axes of the world's greatest population concentration. Some 1.4 billion people, more than half of the world total, live in this part of Asia, including its fringing islands and archipelagoes. India and China together can claim more than a billion inhabitants; Japan, Indonesia, and Pakistan each are fast approaching 100 million. These enormous census counts exist despite the fact that settlement is broken in places by mountainous terrain, stretches of desert, or other areas inhospitable to man and his efforts to wrest a living from the soil.

This populous crescent of Asia has a heritage accrued through tens of centuries—a much longer background than has Europe, which is better known to most Americans. Since World War II virtually every sector within the area has experienced political upheaval, adding confusion and, at times, chaos to an already complex pattern of civilization. Crisis has followed crisis until names such as Laos, Singapore, Kashmir, Tibet, Quemoy, and Panmunjom have been set in heavy type with weary regularity by our news services. Certainly today all parts of this arcuate region are written about at length and discussed by the delegate in

the assembly halls of the United Nations and the man on the street.

Oddly enough, no generally accepted regional term is available for identifying the southern and eastern periphery of Asia as a unit. Joseph E. Spencer, professor of geography at the University of California, Los Angeles, concentrated on this area in his textbook, *Asia, South by East*, from which the title of this article is adapted. One must depend upon rather clumsy expressions such as "southern and eastern Asia" or "the southern and eastern parts of Asia" as terms for the entire region in question. Fortunately, however, a myriad of regional names designate many politico-geographic areas within the confines of the southern and eastern segments of the great continent. Each one normally comprises a combination of political entities, even though any two may overlap to some degree. These regional names serve a useful purpose in discussing world affairs.

A strictly geographic expression, "Monsoon Asia," can be used correctly to indicate that part of southern and eastern Asia which is associated with circulatory winds and heavy seasonal rainfall. This area supports a population running into hundreds of millions. But the word "monsoon" has no politico-geographic significance, and as a result it has not gained wide acceptance except among geographers.

The extensive land mass of Asia is frequently broken down into geographic "realms," some of which may be likened to subcontinents. George B. Cressey, professor of geography at Syracuse University, recognizes three such realms—(1) Subcontinent of India and Pakistan, (2) Southeast Asia, and (3) China-Japan—which taken together generally connote southern and eastern Asia. This division, despite its lack of precision, has gained favor with other geographic writers;

● Mr. Percy is the Geographer of the Department of State. This is the third in a series of articles which he is writing for the *Bulletin on the nomenclature of geographic regions*. For his articles on the Middle East and Latin America, see *Bulletin* of March 23, 1959, p. 407, and September 14, 1959, p. 384.


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nevertheless, some authorities frown at putting the innermost parts of China in the same unit as the coastal part of the country and Japan. They do not find that Tokyo and Urumchi have much in common. The solution suggested is further subdivision that would create another regional bloc encompassing the vast expanses of dry territory remote from the coast.

In current parlance the broad geographic zone sweeping around the southern and eastern edges of Asia might be said to comprise: (1) South Asia, (2) Southeast Asia, and (3) the Far East. South Asia appears to be a comparatively new term supplanting the outmoded term of "subcontinent" to denote India and Pakistan together. Southeast Asia is properly chosen in relation to the orientation of the area it names. Far East in its more limited sense supersedes the use of the country names China and Japan to designate this huge area. But when examined in more detail, this apparently innocuous 3-way division is encumbered with problems in nomenclature and with inconsistencies. Each division in turn demands further clarification in order that one may better understand the interplay of regional terminology in this densely populated area.

#### South Asia

The politicogeographic region of South Asia encompasses India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal, and Bhutan. The first three are members of the British Commonwealth, India and Pakistan as independent republics and Ceylon as a dominion. Nepal ranks as a fully independent kingdom, but Bhutan continues to be guided by India in its external relations. Sikkim, situated along the northern boundary of India between Nepal and Bhutan, is by treaty a protectorate of India. However, one also sees it listed along with Bhutan as a semi-independent state. The Kashmir area, which unquestionably falls within the confines of South Asia, is known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir and is now considered by India for all intents and purposes as being a part of India. It is, however, the subject of a dispute between India and Pakistan. To continue itemizing the political entities that make up South Asia one must include the small Portuguese exclaves of Goa, Damão, and Diu, collectively known as Portuguese India. Within recent years Pondichéry and four other



French exclaves have become integral parts of India, although some few legal measures must still be taken to complete the process.

The place of Afghanistan in a regional grouping is less clear cut. Though the boundary line of South Asia is usually extended to include Afghanistan, that country may at times be identified as a part of the Middle East. Physically it is related to the northern reaches of West Pakistan on the east, the barren plateau lands of Iran on the west, and the Central Asia Republics of the Soviet Union on the north. Border problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan hark back to tribal difficulties in the British-controlled North-West Frontier States before partition. Continuing problems in this area strengthen the relationship—or at least the association—of Afghanistan with South Asia. At present the Pathan (or Pushtun) question continues to focus attention on the Pakistan-Afghanistan boundary area. For example, one not infrequently sees references to "Pushtoonistan" (or "Pakhtoonistan"), the name theoretically applied to the area inhabited by Pushtu-speaking tribes on both sides of the boundary.

South Asia is not a timeworn term. It should be distinguished from "southern Asia," a strictly direction-location term which could conceivably include as much as one-half of the entire continent and be geographically accurate. In the past the area now classed so conveniently as South Asia was held by some to be a part of the Middle East.




In fact, and not without some logic, this concept still persists to a limited extent. In direct contrast the same area has at times been placed within the domain of the Far East, especially among historians. By virtue of its central position on the southern side of the continent, one might facetiously define South Asia as the zone where the Middle East and Far East overlap.

Before partition in 1947 India was widely and even officially referred to as the Subcontinent. This terminology automatically set it apart as a region of significant proportions. A more recently evolved term, "Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent," though far from unknown today, apparently fails to replace the concept of an Indian subcontinent. With little doubt, the term "South Asia," concise and without strong competition, is a welcome addition to the traditional list of comprehensive terms for this politicogeographic region.

### *Lowlands of South Asia*

Within South Asia one finds well-established subregions, most of them related to the broad geographic features of either India or Pakistan or both. Some are of sufficient size and importance to exert a strong or even dominating influence on the politicogeographic balance of the much larger region.

Across India and Pakistan from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal is a boomerang-shaped lowland extending for a distance of more than 2,000 miles. Through a series of interrelated valleys flow the waters of the Ganges, Indus, and Brahmaputra Rivers and their tributaries. Many of the legendary characters in Kipling's stories of British India have trod over the lowland, passing through Delhi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi. The region has three names: (1) Indo-Gangetic Plain, (2) Plain of Hindustan, and (3) Plain of North-





ern India. The latter name, it is significant to note, continues to be used, though much of the area involved lies in Pakistan. In order to limit the lowland area to Indian territory one may speak of the Gangetic Plain, or the trans-Gangetic Plain if one includes the low, fertile Punjab country in northwestern India. Even with this limitation the lowland is not entirely within a single country because the delta of the Ganges lies more in Pakistan than in India.

### *The Mountain Wall*

North of the lowlands rises the mountain wall forming the southern reaches of the Himalayas. Except for Kashmir only fragments of India and Pakistan lie in the high mountainous region. Nevertheless, the dominating aspect of the Himalayan system gives definite regional characteristics to the northern portions of the two countries. Terms that are used to designate this northern fringe include "Mountain Wall" and the "Himalayan Region." In the same vein Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim may be grouped as the Himalayan states.

Webster would hardly define the southern part of India as a peninsula. Its shape is actually that of a gigantic cape, though only Cape Comorin at the southern extremity of the country is so designated generically. Nevertheless, the term "Indian Peninsula" finds common acceptance notwithstanding the fact that it carries two distinct meanings. First, "peninsula" may be used as an adjective applying to all of India as a peninsular country. Second, it may apply only to that part south of the Tropic of Cancer, which protrudes into the waters of the Indian Ocean (or, more precisely, into the waters of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal).

### *The Deccan Plateau*

The huge Deccan Plateau, a distinctive physiographic region, roughly coincides with triangular-shaped peninsular India. Consequently "Deccan" has become a regional term, usually implying the high parts of the country south of the Narbada River. India and Pakistan have many "regions," some of them with populations reaching into the tens of millions, that are held together by cohesive traditions. The names of such regions may well have provided the basis for those of administrative divisions. Probably the two best known re-

gions in this category are the Punjab and Bengal, home of the Punjabi and the Bengali. Partition divided both regions, and now India has East Punjab and West Bengal, whereas Pakistan has West Punjab and East Bengal. Associated with the Punjab in West Pakistan, but extending into India, is the area of the Five Rivers, tributaries of the Indus: Beas, Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, and Sutlej. Here a physical region cut by an international boundary assumes tremendous political significance because of the problem of equitable distribution of lifegiving water. Other regions also derive their names from physical features; for example, the Thar Desert, the Malabar Coast, and the Western Ghats.

A unique example of logical regional thinking lies in the use of the term "Hooghlyside" by Indians to denote the right bank of the Hooghly River, opposite Calcutta, which includes the great industrial city of Howrah. Origin of the term must, of course, be credited to the British, who have their own Merseyside and Tyneside for similar situations.

### **Southeast Asia**

We can credit university circles for the increased use of the term "Southeast Asia." Since World War II several academic institutions, including Cornell University, have established area program studies concentrated on this part of the world. A rising tide of nationalism in lands immediately south of restless Communist forces gives a certain stark unity to the southeastern segment of the Asian Continent. Recognition of its identity as a regional bloc is further justified by virtue of its being pressed against the teeming millions of both the Indo-Pakistan community and China. Some of the countries of Southeast Asia are badly overcrowded, but for the most part the area has a population density somewhat less than critical.

The pattern of political sovereignty in Southeast Asia resembles a patchwork design. In his recent book, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958*, Russell H. Fifield of the University of Michigan counts eight independent states as comprising the region—Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, Philippines, and Indonesia—but several fragmentary dependencies—Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, North Borneo, and Portuguese Timor—are likewise included. Of the latter group all but Portuguese Timor are

British. Western New Guinea, under Dutch administration, constitutes a special case and normally is not considered to be a part of the region.

As might be expected, some authorities take exception to Dr. Fifield's delineation of Southeast Asia. Some authors include Taiwan in this region, despite the close relationship of that island's history to China and Japan. On the other hand, one seldom, if ever, finds Hong Kong and Macao included in any discussion of Southeast Asia. Even though it is far to the west, some foreign authors include Ceylon in the region. Other authorities would reduce the extent of Southeast Asia as defined by Dr. Fifield. British usage, for example, tends to omit the Philippines. Again, according to some scholars the term "Southeast Asia" should actually apply only to the mainland of the Asian Continent; thus Indonesia as well as the Philippines would be excluded. Pakistan, by virtue of its membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, has a vital interest in Southeast Asian affairs, but only East Pakistan is geographically contiguous to the area.

Before Southeast Asia became a popular term, several names prevailed for identifying regional blocs in this general sector of the continent. Some of these names remain in good standing and are readily recognizable; but for the most part they are gathering cobwebs or retain only historical value. As one example, "Farther India," a term seldom heard now, refers to peninsular Southeast Asia. It may or may not encompass the Malay Peninsula. Complementing Farther India is the fading concept of Malaysia, which refers to an insular Southeast Asia, comprising all the islands—including the Philippines—that lie off the coast of Asia between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is the largest island group in the world. But these islands would also be included in the concept of Australasia.<sup>1</sup> Almost synonymous with Malaysia is "Malay Archipelago." However, the Malay Peninsula has at times been regarded as belonging to the former, whereas it is seldom included in the latter.

### *The East Indies*

Although designating an area somewhat more restricted than Malaysia, "East Indies"—more

<sup>1</sup> Australasia is rarely associated with the area under discussion, though according to most interpretations the two would overlap.


specifically, "Netherlands East Indies" or "Dutch East Indies"—long served as a term to mark off the chain of islands extending from Sumatra to New Guinea. The familiar-sounding "Dutch East Indies" as a political term fell into disuse after Indonesia gained its independence in 1949. But geographically the term "East Indies" continues to designate all of the Indonesian islands, together with British Borneo, Portuguese Timor, and the island of New Guinea and its offshore islands. "East Indies" may also apply to a more widespread area, in some cases including the Philippines. The term has even been used collectively to denote India, Farther India, and all the Malaysian area—this broad usage probably dating back to the old concept of the mystic lands of the East, from whence came the spices. Finally, vague though it is, the term "the Indies" when used alone also means East Indies.

### *Indochina*

Indochina (previously hyphenated as Indo-China) defies rational definition. Geographic and political versions of the name depart markedly one from the other, the latter now retaining only a historical meaning. In a purely physical sense Indochina is usually identified as being co-extensive with peninsular Southeast Asia, probably excluding the Malay Peninsula by intent if not by actual definition.

Conflicting with this geographic connotation, the term "Indochina" in a political sense formerly was used only in relation to the French colonies of the peninsula. "French Indochina" was limited territorially to the eastern part of peninsular Southeast Asia comprising Annam, Cambodia, Cochinchina, Laos, and Tonkin, all major administrative divisions within French Indochina. The creation in the early 1950's of the independent states of Viet-Nam (encompassing Annam, Cochinchina, and Tonkin), Cambodia, and Laos vacated the name "French Indochina" as a valid political entity. The area including Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos continues to be called Indochina, but without much justification. If used at all, the term should also include Thailand, Burma, and possibly Malaya.

It is interesting to see how some other countries apply regional names to Southeast Asia. The Chinese call it *Nanyang*, translated as "South Ocean." Similarly, the Japanese say *Nanyō*, which means "Southeast Seas Area." The Aus-



tralians, on the other hand, being faced with another set of directions in viewing this part of the world have quite recently originated the rather startling term of "Near North." If we wished to apply the same reasoning in our part of the world, we could perhaps call the Caribbean Islands and the northern coastal section of continental South America as the "Near South."

#### *The Word "Malay"*

Within Southeast Asia the word "Malay" is the key to a variety of regional concepts, both geographic and political. Malaysia and Malay Archi-

pelago have already been discussed, but, in a much more restricted sense, Malay, when used alone, refers only to the peninsula of that name. The Malay Peninsula includes the Federation of Malaya, or simply Malaya, and small sections of Burma and Thailand. Immediately to the south and connected by a causeway lies the island of Singapore, recently elevated in status from a crown colony to a state within the British Commonwealth. Traditionally any reference to the Malay Peninsula in a political sense included Singapore. But the independence of Malaya in 1957 severed the intricate administrative relation-



ship between the two political entities. Note that the addition of an "a" to Malay, as in Malaya or in former British Malaya, refers to a political rather than geographic area. Three other terms no longer need to be considered except in a historical sense: "Malay States," "Federated Malay States," and "Unfederated Malay States"—all records of water under the bridge in the sequence of events brought about by resurgent nationalism in Southeast Asia.

"Philippines," "Republic of the Philippines," and "Philippine Islands" are not synonyms. "Philippines" is the short form of "Republic of the Philippines" and is used more and more in referring to the relatively new island republic except on official documents. "The Philippine Islands" is strictly a geographic term, not employed by the Filipinos to designate their national domain. As an example, one could say that Manila is located in the Philippine Islands and that

it is the present seat of government of the (Republic of the) Philippines.<sup>2</sup>

#### Far East

Passing counterclockwise from Southeast Asia along the periphery of the continent one reaches the vast region made up of China, Japan, and Korea. Maritime Siberia as well as scattered offshore islands may at times be considered as part of the same region, though usually by inference rather than by definition. "Far East" appears to be the most acceptable term for the area in question. It has the asset of long tradition in applying to the eastern part of Asia. On the other hand, "Far East" denotes no sharp delineation. The broadest definition normally given would consist of the enormous land mass of Asia eastward from the Khyber Pass and Lake Baikal. Even South Asia and Southeast Asia would be incorporated into this broad interpretation of the term. Conversely, the narrowest interpretation would confine the area to Japan, Korea, and a China shorn of its innermost reaches. It is readily apparent that South Asia and Southeast Asia are terms far more precise than Far East.

Another term not without some specific regional connotations is "East Asia." Less widely recognized than Far East, it may be applied to about the same area. In the new geography textbook *The Pattern of Asia*, edited by Norton Ginsburg of the University of Chicago, "East Asia" is given preference over "the Far East." The point is made that "... the term 'Far East' came to be applied to East Asia." As a further example, the Japanese prior to World War II coined the expression "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere." Here a regional term lent itself to political and military action.

More vague than either "the Far East" or "East Asia" is the term "Orient." Though strong in cultural implications, it is becoming obsolete in a regional sense. However, there are those who continue to look upon China and Japan as the Orient. Others would also sweep Korea and Southeast Asia into the category because of common cultural patterns and religious traditions as

<sup>2</sup> Quezon City has been decreed the capital of the Philippines, but as yet most government offices remain in Manila pending actual transfer.



well as a somewhat similar physiognomy of the people throughout this larger region. Indeed, some extremists deem anything "east of Suez" as "oriental." It can be noted, however, that the word "Orient" as an antonym of "Occident" does not necessarily carry a regional meaning and thus may well apply in a cultural sense to all of Asia.


### *Northeast Asia*

The area normally included in the Far East breaks down into two clear-cut divisions: (1) Northeast Asia and (2) China. The Japanese islands and Korea together make up "Northeast Asia," a term rapidly gaining favor politically if not geographically. Manchuria and the eastern part of the Soviet Union fit into any logical locational concept of this region, since they also lie north and east in Asia. But any term delineating such a heterogeneous combination of political entities and parts of political entities serves no well-defined purpose other than for consideration of the physical landscape. Hence, for most effective applications of the term, "Northeast Asia" is limited to Japan and Korea. One would therefore hardly envision it—encompassing only two countries—to be complementary to a more spacious Southeast Asia in any worldwide pattern of regional blocs. China itself makes up the second of the Far East subdivisions, and its politico-geographic complexity entitles it to special consideration.

### *Greater China*

The vast area of Greater China in its traditional sense holds within it five politicogeographic regions that have survived for centuries in one form or another and are still known today: Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet, and China Proper. In size each one would compare favorably with a group of Western European countries. Their geographic limits, never sharp in themselves, have seldom coincided with the ever-changing limits of political control. Even in the face of ill-defined borders, these major subdivisions are widely accepted to designate segments of the eastern Asia mainland.

*Manchuria.* Wedged between Soviet territory and the Korean peninsula, the Manchurian region is sometimes called Northeastern China. In the 1930's the Japanese incursion into Manchuria changed the name on maps to Manchukuo (or



Manchoukuo) but without widespread or lasting effects.

*Mongolia.* Mongolia is an area of internal drainage suited only to nomadism, occupied by Mongols, lying north of the Great Wall. The wide expanse of Mongolia further subdivides geographically into Outer and Inner Mongolia, the latter less arid and lying nearer China Proper than the former.

*Sinkiang.* Sinkiang is made up of a series of large basins and broad tablelands loosely stretching from the Kirgiz Steppe to the Kunlun Mountains. The western and central parts correspond to Chinese Turkestan (or Turkistan).

*Tibet.* Known as the "roof of the world," Tibet is formed by a high plateau rimmed by still higher mountains that have over the centuries fostered the development of an isolated politicoreligious regime. The name "Tibet" has both physical and political meaning, though in the East the two do not necessarily coincide.

*China Proper.* The name "China" itself long had two meanings. It could be construed as encompassing the four outlying areas of Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet—often called Greater China. Or it might exclude them and be coextensive with the 18 old provinces south of the Great Wall.<sup>3</sup> This area, known to geographers as China Proper, closely corresponds to the popular conception of China as a land of teeming mil-

<sup>3</sup> Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Honan, Hopeh, Hunan, Hupeh, Kansu, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Kweichow, Shansi, Shantung, Shensi, Szechwan, and Yunnan.



lions. Even here there is a well-established breakdown into North China and South China, with cultural overtones based on regional differences.

In contrast to the broad dimensions of China, the narrow limits of Japan furnish few regional concepts of any appreciable dimensions. "North-east Japan" and "South-east Japan" are well recognized, each based on segments of the populous Pacific margin of the islands. Several other areas, some of them quite small, have likewise become associated with well-known names. Of primary importance are the names of the four major islands that comprise the country and also serve as regional names: Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku. Honshu has nearly 60 percent of the area and approximately 75 percent of the population of Japan and, because of its relative importance, frequently assumes the role of the archipelago's "mainland." The situation is somewhat comparable to that of Great Britain in its relation to the British Isles.

The geographic term "Inland Sea" (*Seto Naikai*) identifies the busy body of water separating Honshu from Shikoku and Kyushu. In the center of Honshu a zone of rugged volcanic mountains has assumed recognition as the Japanese Alps. Finally, almost on a miniature scale, are the Kanto, Nobi, and Kinki Plains along the southern Honshu coast, which are fertile pockets supporting the largest cities and densest population.

#### Department of State Regional Bureaus

The crescent-shaped southern and eastern portion of Asia under discussion falls within the jurisdiction of two regional bureaus in the Department of State. In the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA) the Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA) carries responsibility for an area closely corresponding to the concept of South Asia presented in this article.

In the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) the relationships between regional responsibilities and the politicogeographic area known as the Far East are apparent but somewhat more intricate than in SOA. The Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (SEA) covers peninsular Southeast Asia except Malaya, Singapore, and British Borneo. These latter plus Indonesia and the Philippines,

normally considered as part of the same region geographically, make up part of the extensive coverage of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (SPA), which also includes almost all of Oceania.

The Far East as we have visualized it in this article is divided between the Office of Chinese Affairs (CA), which is responsible for affairs on the Communist-controlled mainland, in free China, and in Hong Kong, and the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (NA), the latter encompassing only Japan, the Ryukyus, and Korea. Thus, with but one noteworthy modification—that of insular southeast Asia—the Departmental breakdown of regional offices within the regional bureaus does not deviate from accepted geographic concepts.

#### East Versus West

Somewhere seaward from the outer eastern periphery of the Asian Continent lies a shadowy line which in the American mind divides East from West. Inheriting much of our directional outlook from Europe, we normally regard any point in Asia as being East. To us, the Far East is the same as it is for, say, a Belgian or a Greek. Such a concept is not always plausible from the standpoint of the distance involved. For example, from San Francisco to Tokyo the distance is nearly 20,000 miles if one measures in an easterly direction, but only 5,100 miles in a westerly direction.

Even though we think of Japan, the Philippines, and other parts of Asia as being in the East, a westbound crossing of the Pacific to Asia gives us a western outlook in relation to the ocean itself and its western borderlands. Paradoxically, then, we may think of the Pacific's western margin as either West or East. Americans have come to associate certain areas with a western direction. For example, during World War II our experiences in the southwest Pacific turned our minds westward. Pearl Harbor and, later on, Tarawa, Guadalcanal, and Leyte loomed as trouble spots in the west. Likewise, we presently look into the setting sun toward our bastions of defense in the western Pacific, notwithstanding the fact that they lie along the margin of the Asian Continent itself. On the other hand, all conceptions of a "West" disappear with any fundamental analysis of the continent itself. The Koreans, the Japanese, the Filipinos, and others native to

Asian soil are unquestionably of the East. As Americans we have an antipodean way of thinking which is very special indeed.

### Changing of Names

In any part of the world geographic place names inevitably undergo change with the passing of time. A new discovery, a new hero, an altered political outlook, or perhaps boredom with an existing order may stimulate innovations in geographic terminology. In some parts of southern and eastern Asia since World War II impressive lists of names have been switched, usually from a European to an Asiatic tongue. The Indonesians, for example, elected to substitute place names of their own language for those conceived by the Dutch during colonial days. With the introduction of *Djakarta* we no longer think of *Batavia*, former name of the great metropolis on the Island of Java. Some changes in Indonesia have been less revolutionary, as *Surabaya* for *Soerabaya*. Nor have island names escaped the Indonesian drive for its own terminology. One frequently sees *Djawa* for *Java*, *Sumatera* for *Sumatra*, *Kalimantan* for *Borneo*, *Sulawesi* for *Celebes*, and so on.

In India, too, place name changes evidence the surge of a new national spirit. Indians have vacated English names of provinces and cities in favor of their own. *United Provinces* became *Uttar Pradesh* (fortunately without changing the standard abbreviation). In some cases the changes have been rather obvious, as *Kānpur* for *Cawnpore* and *Banāras* for *Benares*. In other cases, city names that were already complex sounding in English became even more complex sounding in an Indian language. Two examples are *Tiruchirāppalli* for *Trichinopoly* and *Vizakhāpatnam* for *Vizagapatam*.

### Summary

Increasing politicogeographic importance is being attached to the peripheral crescent of south and east Asia which must support more people than all of the rest of the world put together. The continued centrifugal expansion of world power from established centers in the Western World more and more embroils Asiatic regions in international politics. Since the close of World

War II, Karachi,<sup>4</sup> New Delhi, Colombo, Rangoon, Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Vientiane, and Manila have all been added to the constellation of world capitals. On television it is not at all uncommon to hear on-the-spot commentators speaking from these cities as well as from London, Paris, Rome, Pretoria, Ankara, and Buenos Aires. It is essential to recognize South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East as the critical world regional blocs that they are and to know them well in terms of geographic nomenclature. Should more precise meanings be required for these and other regional terms, one may always specifically say what is included. To do so by no means invalidates the usefulness of the terms themselves.

### Americans Reminded To Reregister Mining Concessions in Cuba

Press release 18 dated January 15

In connection with Cuban Law 617 issued by the Cuban Council of Ministers on October 27, 1959, and published in the *Official Gazette* of the Republic of Cuba October 30, 1959, American citizens are reminded of the deadline of February 27, 1960, for the required reregistration of title of ownership of mining concessions in Cuba. Solicitors and nominal beneficiaries of exploitations of minerals classified under the second and third sections in the Decree Law of Bases of December 29, 1868, in Cuba must also reregister their requests. These registrations are to be made with the Mine and Petroleum Department of the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture in Habana, Cuba. The Cuban law provides that, if registration is not made in accordance with the provisions of law, ownership and concession rights revert to the state.

In effecting the reregistration, the law states grantees are obligated to declare, if appropriate, the name and other personal data of persons to whom the mines are leased.

The Department understands that the reregistration taxes are as follows:

<sup>4</sup> Pending the construction of the new capital city on the Potwar Plateau, Rawalpindi is serving as the administrative center of Pakistan. Meanwhile, Karachi remains the legal capital.

(a) Payment of \$100 for reregistration request for each mine.

(b) Payment of an annual tribute of \$20 per hectare for mines which are not under adequate exploitation in the judgment of the Mine and Petroleum Department of the Ministry of Agriculture.

(c) Payment of a \$10 annual tribute per hectare for mines which are being adequately exploited in the judgment of the Mine and Petroleum Department.

The law also provides that, aside from the annual tribute on the surface level, grantees are obligated to pay the state as a share 5 percent in cash or in its equal value as determined by the state on the calculated value of the minerals extracted in their concessions in accordance with the highest average yearly quotation registered in the world market. If exported, the participation of the state in the minerals or concentrates of minerals will be 25 percent of the value thereof.

## **United States Protests Cuban Property Seizures**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 7 dated January 11

Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal, who returned to Habana on Sunday [January 10], delivered today [January 11] to the Ministry of Foreign Relations a note,<sup>1</sup> prepared in the Department of State during the Ambassador's period of consultation in Washington, protesting to the Government of Cuba the numerous actions taken by officials of that Government which are considered by the United States Government to be in denial of the basic rights of ownership of United States

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; for a Department statement concerning Ambassador Bonsal's meeting with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos at Habana on Oct. 27, 1959, see BULLETIN of Nov. 16, 1959, p. 715.

citizens in Cuba—rights provided under both Cuban law and generally accepted international law.

The actions in question involve principally the seizure and occupation of land and buildings of United States citizens without court orders and frequently without any written authorization whatever, the confiscation and removal of equipment, the seizure of cattle, the cutting and removal of timber, the plowing under of pastures, all without the consent of the American owners. In many cases no inventories were taken nor were any receipts proffered nor any indication afforded that payment was intended to be made. These acts have been carried out in the name of the National Agrarian Reform Institute.

(A case was cited in which a marine dredge and a tugboat under United States registry valued at approximately half a million dollars were seized without any written authorization, inventory, or receipt.)

Several of these cases have been previously brought to the attention of the Government of Cuba by the Embassy of the United States but without result. Nor have the direct protests of the interested parties been fruitful.

The United States Government in its notes of June 11<sup>2</sup> and October 12, 1959,<sup>3</sup> to the Government of Cuba expressed its full support of soundly conceived programs for rural betterment, including land reform. This support has been demonstrated by United States assistance given such programs in many countries. However, the United States Government at the same time expressed its firm belief that their attainment is not furthered by the failure of the Government of Cuba to recognize the legal rights of United States citizens who have made investments in Cuba in reliance upon the adherence of the Government of Cuba to principles of equity and justice.

<sup>2</sup> For the substance of the note of June 11, see *ibid.*, June 29, 1959, p. 958.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

## Operation of the Mutual Security Program, January 1-June 30, 1959

### EXCERPTS FROM 16TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

#### PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Transmitted herewith is the Sixteenth Semi-annual Report on the operation of the Mutual Security Program for the period ending June 30, 1959. The report was prepared under the direction of the Coordinator for the Mutual Security Program by the Department of State, including the International Cooperation Administration, the Department of Defense, and the Development Loan Fund.

The information set forth in the report demonstrates once again that today our national security is directly involved with nations and happenings throughout the world.

The Mutual Security Program is flexibly designed to meet military threats where they occur and to make an effective contribution toward the cooperative effort of the nations of the free world to promote economic development.

The economic problems of the newly developing nations of the world pose a challenge to our wisdom and energy, and to our steadfastness of purpose, that is as demanding in its own way as the blunt threat of an armed attack. Our economic development and economic aid programs are designed to meet this challenge and its ever-changing problems by selective and prudent use of the talents and resources available under the Mutual Security Program.

<sup>1</sup> H. Doc. 299, 86th Cong., 2d sess.; reprinted here are chapters I through IV. Copies of the report may be obtained upon request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

The military, economic and technical assistance provided by the Mutual Security Program is essential to the achievement of our foreign policy objectives. A strong Program, vigorously and intelligently implemented, will see the challenge that confronts us surmounted. But a weakening of the Program can only invite the destruction of our free-world society.

This report affords the Congress a means of measuring what has been done by the United States and its friends to preserve a world where men and nations can live in freedom, without fear.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE  
January 14, 1960

#### I. CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

In the 14 years since the end of World War II it has become entirely clear that the social, political, and economic structure of the world is undergoing a profound and sometimes violent change. Old empires have disappeared and new countries have risen in their place. Nearly all of them live with intense desires for rapid internal developments. Taking advantage of the hopes of the new countries, as well as of the dislocations and exhaustion of the war, the Soviet Union extended its control in the immediate postwar years over formerly independent countries, and continues its efforts to extend and increase its control everywhere else.

The Mutual Security Program (MSP) is one of



the most important tools designed to cope with the external dangers to the security of the United States. In the broadest sense, it protects our security by shielding the free world from external attack. At the same time behind the shield, it is helping to strengthen its political and economic stability. The danger we face externally is complex and continuing. At one end of the scale it begins with the skillfully manipulated military threat of the Soviet Union to the physical safety of the United States, its allies, and other nations of the free world. At the other end of the scale it ends with a more diffuse but no less real threat. This is the explosion that may result if people in the emergent countries are frustrated in their determination to end the squalor and hunger and sickness in which they live. As these are totally different kinds of danger to our security, so must the methods employed in dealing with them be different.

With the end of World War II, the nature of the threat to the United States and the West altered abruptly. From the clear cut test of war with the Axis Powers, the threat shifted to the shadowy area where the economic exhaustion of our Western allies might make them powerless victims of the Soviet Union, whose leaders were flushed with victory and intent on extending their power westward until stopped. This threat was countered by the "Marshall Plan" which was designed to restore vigor to the exhausted economies of Western Europe and thus encourage in the peoples and governments of Western Europe the will to protect their independence. The associated military threat posed by the existence of huge Soviet forces garrisoned in the Baltic States, Poland, East Germany, Austria, and Hungary was countered by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States provided much of the motive force in developing the military forces of the NATO countries, and in the earlier days of NATO provided the lion's share of the modern equipment used by NATO forces. The United States also furnished much of the military leadership in the higher echelons of NATO.

The economic viability of Western Europe was restored, in part by the assistance furnished through the Marshall Plan, in part by the vigorous efforts of the western Europeans themselves, and

in part by the cumulative effect of these and other factors on the revival of world trade. When it had accomplished its purpose (ahead of schedule), the Marshall Plan was terminated in 1951. The introduction of limited currency convertibility in late 1958—which meant in fact that all western European currencies were "hard"—symbolized the return to full vigor of the European economy.

While the favorable nature of the economic, political, and military developments in Europe permitted the termination of the Marshall Plan and the substantial scaling down of military aid in that area, the Soviet threat to Western Europe and the overall threat to the security of the United States continues; checked in Europe, it has broadened its scope and assumed less easily identifiable forms.

The Mutual Security Program is designed in part to cope with the military threat to the free world. The continuation of this threat will in all likelihood require the continued existence of its military arm, the Military Assistance Program. But even if the military threat were to disappear tomorrow, other problems of almost equal severity would continue to call on our ingenuity and our resources. These problems, often hard to identify at first glance as threats to the United States, are in general centered around the aspirations of the new and underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The drive to achieve these aspirations, sometimes called the revolution of rising expectations, has its internal political expression in every country concerned. Here millions on millions of people have seen that it is not ordained that they must live in perpetual squalor and illness, on the ragged edge of starvation, and their political leaders press the point home. In a variety of ways this revolution is moving forward by fits and starts, often uncertain of its direction, sometimes involved in the free world struggle against communism, sometimes not. The American people sympathize with these aspirations, and wish the new and underdeveloped countries well in their struggle to improve their lot. But sympathy aside, it is clearly in the interest of the United States that we assist this movement so that the underdeveloped countries may take their place as free, independent and prosperous members of the community of nations as quickly as possible and with the least possible stress and turmoil. It



is equally against our interests that this forward movement be stifled or hindered. To hamper this movement would breed only frustration and more explosive threats to political and economic stability.

One of the sparks that set off the revolution of rising expectations early in the postwar period was the dramatic effect of the worldwide application of public health measures. Malaria was almost wiped out in large areas of the world, thus reducing the death rate drastically. Other health measures applied for the first time on a large scale had equally startling effects, and stemming from them, at least in part, what constitutes a significant rise in the population figures is now under way. The explosion is taking place in the least developed countries, those most possessed by the revolutionary urge to improve the physical lot of their people, and those least able to cope with the deluge of new mouths to feed. Thus, where creating a viable modern society would have been a difficult job at best, it now becomes immensely more complicated and more urgent. The rapid growth of population may well prove to be one of the greatest obstacles to economic and social progress and the maintenance of political stability in many of the less developed areas of the world.

These are some of the great problems affecting the security of the United States at both short and long range, with which the Mutual Security Program is designed to deal. The nature of the threats to the security of the United States and the stability of the free world have shifted during the 10 years of life of the MSP. We must also expect that the nature of the problems we face in 1959 will change in the years to come, and our response to the new face these problems present must also change accordingly. To meet these shifting problems, the introduction of new tools and techniques—the International Development Association for example—is well underway.

The United States can neglect or ignore only at its own ultimate peril the grave problems sketched in the preceding paragraphs. It has been clearly recognized that they constitute a threat to our security; they have been and are being dealt with. What has been the price for coping with these problems through the Mutual Security Program? For fiscal year 1959 the Congress appropriated

\$3.4 billion for all MSP activities, of which \$1.5 billion was for military assistance. This figure of \$3.4 billion was .74 percent of our Gross National Product, 4.3 percent of the Federal budget, and equal to 8.4 percent of the military appropriations for the year. To help put this sum in better perspective, during fiscal year 1959 the American people spent \$17 billion on recreation, including \$3 billion on radio and television, \$30.4 billion on the purchase and operation of automobiles, and \$4.5 billion on household furniture.

The following pages contain the record of the problems with which the Mutual Security Program contended during fiscal year 1959 and the steps taken to solve these problems. Sometimes the response failed of its purpose; far more often, however, the hard work, ingenuity, and skill of the military and civilian authors and executors of MSP, using the tools with which they were equipped, achieved the results sought for.

## II. THE DRAPER COMMITTEE REPORT

In November 1958 the President appointed a committee composed of distinguished private citizens to make an "independent, objective and non-partisan analysis of the military assistance aspects of our Mutual Security Program . . ." The President indicated he was "particularly interested in your committee's critical appraisal . . . of the relative emphasis which should be given to military and economic programs . . ."<sup>2</sup>

The report prepared in response to the President's instructions is thoughtful, detailed, and comprehensive. It goes deeply into why the Mutual Security Program exists, how it operates, and the relationship between the two major parts of the program, military aid, and economic aid. A close study of the report will be well repaid with a clear understanding of the major forces

<sup>2</sup> For names of members of the Committee, see BULLETIN of Dec. 15, 1958, p. 954. For text of the Committee's report of Mar. 17, 1959, and the President's letter of transmittal to Congress, see *ibid.*, June 1, 1959, p. 796; for text of the Committee's letters of transmittal of their reports of June 3, July 13, and Aug. 17, 1959, to the President, together with the President's letters of transmittal to Congress, see *ibid.*, July 13, 1959, p. 46, Aug. 10, 1959, p. 208, and Sept. 14, 1959, p. 390.

at work in the world today, and how they affect American security.

The report makes constructive criticisms of some aspects of MSP and offers recommendations for changes designed to cure the flaws it discerned, in both military and economic aspects of the program. These recommendations are now under intensive study in the executive branch of the Government, and certain of them have already been adopted.

The following paragraphs briefly sketch out and summarize some of the major conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.

In response to the President's request for a critical appraisal of the relative emphasis which should be given to military and economic programs, the committee observed that it knew of no continuing formula that could satisfactorily determine the relative emphasis, whether overall or in respect to any particular country.

The Committee stated that from the standpoint of U.S. interests it saw no competitive relationship between military and economic assistance, and did not consider that the Military Assistance Program (MAP) is too great in relation to the economic aid and development program.

In another recommendation of a general nature, the Committee urged a major, sustained effort to make available to the public all the facts about the program. In order to do so it recommended that:

... Presidential instructions be issued to the appropriate agencies to institute vigorous measures to inform the American public adequately concerning MSP; and ... that unjustified attacks upon the program be answered publicly, promptly and forcefully. ...

#### **Military Assistance—Past Performance**

1. The Mutual Security Program has played a significant role in deterring a third world war, in keeping many nations free, in supporting our strategic system of alliances and overseas bases, and in providing hope for economic progress among the peoples of the less developed countries.

2. The Military Assistance Program has provided cohesion, strength, and credibility to our collective security arrangements. It ... has been one of the principal instruments abroad supporting our foreign policy objectives over this decade of clash with communism.

3. It provided a large part of the weapons, material, and other support which made possible the rearmament of Europe. For the past decade, further Communist encroachment in this vital area has thereby been denied, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues as an essential security bulwark of the free world.

4. It achieved the strengthening of the nations around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

5. The Military Assistance Program influenced a shift in current Communist tactics from direct military aggression to subversion, propaganda, and economic offensives.

#### **Military Assistance—Recommendations for the Future**

1. The Committee concluded that the necessary average level of expenditures that should be marked for military assistance over the next few years is not likely to be less, in general, than that required in the recent past. Continued appropriations at the present \$1.5 or \$1.6 billion level would result in a reduction in the program by one-third of the present ratio of deliveries.<sup>3</sup> The Committee pointed out that such a reduction would in fact amount to a fundamental change in U.S. national policy, implying a strategic retreat in the face of the Communist threat.

2. \$400 million should be made available, primarily for the NATO area, in addition to the \$1.6 billion requested for fiscal year 1960.<sup>3</sup>

3. Military assistance should be planned and proposed on a long term basis—3 and later 5 years.

4. There should be a continuing authorization for the military assistance appropriation, in order to provide a sound legislative framework for multiyear planning and programing.

5. The military assistance appropriation should be placed in the Department of Defense budget. (It has been carried heretofore as a major separate item in the budget of the Mutual Security Program, with Technical Cooperation, the Development Loan Fund, and so forth.)

<sup>3</sup> This portion of the Committee Report was written in early 1959, during fiscal year 1959, when appropriations were \$1.5 billion. Appropriations for MAP for fiscal year 1960 were reduced by the Congress to \$1.3 billion. [Footnote in original.]

### **Economic Aid—Past Performance**

1. The substantial expenditures made in recent years for economic assistance are justified on grounds both of enlightened self-interest and of our moral responsibility to ourselves to do what we can to help other people realize their legitimate aspirations.

2. Economic aid programs assist less developed nations in achieving economic progress and thereby promote an international climate which facilitates the realization of our own national objectives and those of the free world. At the same time, these programs decrease the opportunities for Communist political and economic domination.

3. Irrespective of the Communist threat, the economic development of these nations is a desirable end in itself. The United States cannot prosper in isolation. The strength of our economy and the survival of our free institutions are dependent upon our being a part of a community of nations which is making acceptable economic and political progress.

4. There is no implication (by the Committee) that we must continue all of our economic assistance programs indefinitely.

5. The economic development of a country is primarily its own responsibility. Aid . . . should not ordinarily be furnished and cannot achieve real results unless the recipient nation has the desire and determination to help itself.

6. Many forms of U.S. economic assistance must continue for as long as the Communist threat exists, and certainly until greater economic progress has been made in underdeveloped nations.

7. Management of our aid activities has become an extraordinarily difficult administrative undertaking. While administration and coordination of these programs has improved in recent years, there is no question that some of the criticisms made in connection with economic aid programs are justified. However, the programs must be continued and better administered not emasculated or abandoned.

### **Recommendations for Future Economic Aid**

1. Starting in fiscal year 1961 funds for development lending under the Mutual Security Program should be made available at the rate of \$1 billion a year.

2. Continuing authorization and longer range

funding should be provided for the Development Loan Fund (DLF). (At present authorization, i.e., the continued life of DLF, has been provided by the Congress on a 2-year basis. Appropriations for the lending capital of the Fund have been made annually. These procedures make forward planning by the United States and the borrowing country extremely difficult.)

3. Continuing authorization should be provided for technical assistance. (Congressional authorization, i.e., continued life, is given to the Technical Cooperation Program on a year-to-year basis. The nature of technical cooperation (described briefly in chapter 2) is such that projects can rarely be planned and brought to completion in 1 year. Sensible and prudent planning of effective projects thus becomes very difficult.)

4. Available surplus agricultural commodities should be utilized more effectively, extensively, and flexibly than at present in support of mutual security objectives.

5. A single agency should be responsible for administering the major related economic assistance programs and activities.

### **III. OPERATIONS OF THE PROGRAM**

#### **Fiscal Aspects**

For fiscal year 1959 the Congress appropriated \$3.448 billion for the Mutual Security Program. This figure included a supplemental appropriation of \$150 million for the Development Loan Fund. The chart on p. 164 illustrates how MSP funds were divided among major elements of the program. Table 1 illustrates the allocation of funds by region and type of assistance for fiscal year 1959.


The sum appropriated by the Congress, in legislation finally approved on August 28, 1958, was 16 percent less than that requested by the President. It amounted to  $\frac{3}{4}$  of 1 percent of our Gross National Product in 1958, and was slightly more than was spent by the American people for radio and television sets in 1958.

With Mutual Security Program funds, aid was given to 60 countries during fiscal year 1959. The great variety of purposes it was designed to achieve are described in detail later in this report. \$1.551 billion in military assistance was provided to 38 countries, and \$807 million in defense sup-

# MUTUAL SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS

(\$ Millions)


FY 1959



Total ... \$3,448\* Million

\*Includes DLF supplemental appropriation of \$150 million.

FY 1960



Total ... \$3,226 Million

port was obligated under programs in 12 countries, all of which (with one exception—Spain) are on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. \$282 million was obligated for special assistance, and \$166 million for the Technical Cooperation Programs, carried out in 49 countries and 9 territories. The Congress appropriated \$550 million for DLF operations during the year. Against available loan capital formal loan offers of \$596 million were made, and \$522 million was obligated.

In general it should be noted that a substantial proportion of the goods and services purchased or ordered with funds appropriated by the Congress are not actually delivered during the same year for which the funds are appropriated. This is due to time necessarily consumed in planning, and in ordering, manufacturing, and final delivery of the goods or services in question. Most, although not all, of the goods and services which were ordered—that is, for which funds were obligated—in fiscal year 1958 were actually delivered in fiscal year 1959. Similarly those for which funds were obligated in fiscal year 1959 will be delivered during fiscal year 1960. In general pay-

ment for goods and services is made at the time of delivery. Therefore, most funds appropriated by the Congress for fiscal year 1959 and obligated by the MSP during fiscal year 1959, are actually paid out as expenditures during fiscal year 1960, and in subsequent years.

## Operations

The operations of the MSP during fiscal year 1959 were affected by a series of crises during the first half of the fiscal year, and relatively normal operating conditions during the second half. Between July and December 1958 the Lebanon crisis occurred, the Iraq Government was overthrown by revolution, a grave crisis developed in Jordan, a coup d'etat took place in Pakistan, and the Government of Sudan fell. In addition the Berlin crisis was precipitated by the U.S.S.R. On the other side of the world, the Taiwan Strait crisis was precipitated by the Chinese Communists. This list by no means exhausts the catalog of countries in crisis and ferment during the year; some, like Tibet, had no direct impact on operations of



the MSP. Other countries, like Iran, while not inflamed by internal crisis, were subjected to the stresses and tensions created by revolutions in adjoining countries.

The second half of the year was relatively free of crises. MSP operations, after adjusting to the problems created in the first half of the year, went forward in as normal a fashion as is possible in such an immensely complicated operation.

Administratively, strenuous efforts were made to increase efficiency, both by the Washington agencies involved and their representatives in the field. The Draper Committee report, described in more detail elsewhere in this report, pointed out that "there is no more difficult administrative undertaking in the United States Government than . . . the management of the various economic assistance programs . . ." Measurable progress was made in recruiting personnel well adapted to overseas life, and in training them after recruitment. Various internal steps designed to speed up operations were taken. For example, by November 30, 1958, ICA had approved programs representing 89 percent of its fiscal year 1959 funds, compared with 26 percent a year earlier. By the end of December 1958, 38 percent of the funds available to ICA for fiscal year 1959 had been obligated, compared with 25 percent a year earlier.

Similar efforts to improve the administrative aspects of the Military Aid Program were also being taken.

## Military Assistance Program (MAP)

The Military Assistance Program, for which \$1.515 billion was appropriated in fiscal year 1959, is designed to help support the collective security effort of the free world and strengthen the common defense. The MAP cooperates with 47 countries in a great variety of ways. The actual form which military assistance takes varies from region to region and country to country, taking into account different capabilities, degree of threat and strategic importance, political climate, and economic strength. In general the criteria used in deciding whether to provide military assistance are the following: (1) the importance of the force being aided to the defense of the United States, or the protection against internal subversion of an area important to the security of the United States; the degree of inability of the recipient country (political, economic, or technical) to supply its needs from its own resources; and (2) the importance of an area because of its strategic position, and/or its strategic resources; its political support for U.S. objectives, or similar objectives not necessarily directly related to the countries' military strength, but vitally important to accomplishing broad U.S. security objectives.

The lion's share of the fiscal year 1959 MAP program went to the Far East (\$695 million), and the Near East and South Asia (\$415 million). Aid to Europe amounted to \$345 million, to Latin America \$55 million, and to Africa \$12 million. These sums provided guns, aircraft, naval vessels,

TABLE 1  
Distribution of Programs by Region and Category  
of Assistance, Fiscal Year 1959<sup>1</sup>

(In millions of dollars)

Region	Total program	Military assistance	Defense support	Technical cooperation	Special assistance	Other programs	DLF
Europe . . . . .	\$461.6	\$345.2	\$49.9	\$3.0	\$33.0	-----	\$30.5
Near East and South Asia . . . . .	1,066.4	415.7	217.9	40.4	83.0	<sup>2</sup> \$23.0	286.4
Africa . . . . .	171.8	12.3	-----	15.5	102.6	-----	41.4
Far East . . . . .	1,395.8	695.3	539.5	32.6	9.1	<sup>3</sup> .7	118.6
Latin America . . . . .	159.2	55.3	-----	35.5	24.3	-----	44.1
Undistributed and nonregional . . . . .	421.6	268.1	.4	40.6	30.2	81.1	1.2
Less prior year availability . . . . .	-240.4	-240.4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total fiscal year 1959 program . . . . .	3,436.0	1,551.5	807.7	167.6	282.2	104.8	522.2

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary figures. Military assistance data are program figures; other data are fiscal year 1959 obligations.

<sup>2</sup> Palestine refugees.

<sup>3</sup> Asian Economic Development Fund.

and the training of many men (and thus the upgrading of many forces). A detailed report of the operation of MAP will be found in each of the regional sections of this report.<sup>4</sup>

#### **Defense Support (DS)**

Defense support (administered by the ICA) is that economic assistance required, in addition to military assistance, in order to permit a specific contribution to the common defense by another country where U.S. military aid is helping to support significant military forces. Defense support country programs are described in detail in the regional sections of this report.

Defense support stems from specific military requirements, but its content is economic. The need for defense support is determined by (1) an analysis of the economic and financial capability of the country to meet the cost of the required military effort without incurring economic instability, and (2) the country's willingness to take all reasonable measures needed to develop its own defense capacities, consistent with its political, economic, and manpower capacity to do so.

During fiscal year 1959, \$808 million was obligated for defense support—\$540 million to the Far East, \$218 million to the Near East and South Asia, and \$50 million to one European country (Spain).

#### **Development Loan Fund (DLF)**

The DLF, described in detail in a separate chapter of this report,<sup>4</sup> is a new and powerful tool designed to support and encourage long range economic development in the less developed countries of the world. DLF's role is to provide capital to accelerate economic growth through direct loans and other forms of credit. For fiscal year 1959, its first full year of operation, the Congress appropriated \$550 million in capital. The DLF undertakes financing only when presented with specific development proposals, and only when financing is unavailable on reasonable terms from private investments, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Export-Import Bank, or other free world sources. It can accept repayment in local currencies, when warranted.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed here.

#### **Technical Cooperation (TC)**

Technical cooperation, which is administered by the ICA, is nothing less than an effort to convey the skills and techniques and accumulated experience of our society to those of the less developed countries which need them and want them. For the first time in history, through the U.S. Technical Cooperation programs, the U.N. Technical Assistance Program (UNTA), the Colombo Plan, the Organization of American States (OAS), and some others, the proven skills and techniques of the more advanced nations are being directed—deliberately and effectively—to attack on a broad scale the economic and social problems of the less developed countries. \$166 million was obligated for TC in 1959, of which \$21.6 million was directed to the U.S. share in UNTA, and \$1.2 million to OAS. The balance was employed for bilateral technical cooperation.

Technical cooperation activities are generally organized in the form of jointly agreed projects, and the foreign government usually bears the greater share of the cost of the project. The TC program complements special assistance; defense support, and loans from the World Bank and DLF. For example, DLF and World Bank loans frequently have resulted from preliminary economic and technical feasibility studies, undertaken under the Technical Cooperation Program. One of the best examples of such complementary effort is the Lebanon Litani Basin development program. This development program is now being carried out with an IBRD loan, after its feasibility had been demonstrated by an American survey group provided under the Technical Cooperation Program. Technical cooperation projects have assisted in the establishment of productivity centers, the drafting of investment laws, and so forth. The need for different types of projects and the feasibility of completing them varies greatly from country to country.

#### **Special Assistance**

The Special Assistance Program, for which \$282 million was obligated in fiscal year 1959 is economic aid necessary to achieve political, economic, humanitarian or other objectives of the United States in any country where the United States is not providing military assistance in support of significant military forces, and where needs for

such assistance cannot appropriately or fully be provided under technical cooperation or from the DLF. Special assistance, which is administered by the ICA, is also the source of funds for certain other programs (such as malaria eradication) which serve important U.S. interests and which are not appropriate for financing under other categories of assistance.

A common characteristic of most countries receiving special assistance is their strategic location; many of them are accessible and vulnerable to bloc penetration. During fiscal year 1959, \$102 million was provided for special assistance in the Near East-South Asia area, \$83 million in Africa, \$24 million in Latin America, \$25 million in Europe, and \$9 million in the Far East. In addition \$25.6 million was provided for malaria eradication, and \$4.3 million for support to American schools abroad. The special assistance program is described in detail in a separate chapter later in this report.<sup>5</sup>

#### **Section 517 of the Mutual Security Act**

The Mutual Security Act of 1958 added Section 517 to the Act of 1954, as amended. That section became operative during fiscal year 1959. It sets up certain specific planning requirements as prerequisites to agreements or grants, constituting obligations of the U.S. in excess of \$100,000, for defense support, special assistance, and certain other forms of economic assistance. The principal purpose of this section of the Act is to insure that necessary engineering, financial and other planning has been completed in advance of the obligation of U.S. funds for the final design or construction of a project. The procedures whereby this requirement is met, along with other related procedures followed in the administration of economic aid programs, are directed at avoiding the premature obligation of U.S. funds before there has been sufficient advance planning to assure that the assistance provided will effectively accomplish the purpose for which it is intended.

#### **IV. DEFENSE EFFORT—MILITARY ASSISTANCE**

Military assistance, like the several forms of economic aid which make up the balance of the Mutual Security Program, is an instrument of

U.S. foreign policy. All types of assistance provided to our allies complement each other in promoting the security and progress of the free world. This dual objective is directly reflected in the categories of aid which contribute to allied military strength and those whose primary purpose is to foster economic stability and development of the non-Communist world. Although neither category can be considered more important than the other, it is clear that security is a prerequisite to progress. Only behind the shield of common defense can the nations of the free world pursue their goals of continued independence, economic growth, and a better life for all their peoples in a world at peace.

That shield, the combined military strength of the United States and its free world partners, is in large measure the creation of the Military Assistance Program. In less than a decade, this pioneer venture in peacetime multinational military cooperation, starting almost from scratch and with no precedents to guide its development, has been instrumental in the creation of a common defense. All around the perimeter of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains allied forces which the Military Assistance Program has helped to train and equip stand ready to repel Communist probes designed to test free world ability and will to resist. These allied troops around the globe are our first line to deter, and to contain, local engagements which could all too easily explode into the ultimate disaster of total war.

Thus there emerges clear proof of the vital contribution of the Military Assistance Program to the security and defense of the United States. The relationship between military assistance, and the availability of overseas bases essential to effective deployment of our own advanced forces and missiles makes it even more strikingly apparent that national security is reinforced by collective security. The degree to which we benefit from our participation in the common defense of the free world, is sharply revealed in the following statement by the Secretary of Defense:

We intend through our Military Assistance Program to continue to build up the forces of our allies. These are the forces which in many parts of the world would have to take the initial brunt of an aggressor's attack. Dollars spent wisely on them will increase our limited war, as well as our unlimited war capabilities, and save us many dollars in our own defense expenditures. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff recently stated, with complete unanimity, that they would not want one dollar added to our own defense

<sup>5</sup> Not printed here.

expenditure if that dollar had to come out of our Military Assistance Program.

The effective response of the Chinese Nationalist forces to the attempted aggression in the Taiwan Strait during the late summer of 1958 was possible only because the will to resist was backed up by military might brought into being by equipment and training provided through the Military Assistance Program. Had not such defensive strength been in existence at the time of attack, the outcome in the Taiwan Strait might have been very different. The United States might well, in fulfilling its international obligations, have had no alternative to direct intervention, with the inevitable risk of spreading conflict. Those who question the need for our support of such large forces on Taiwan and in other areas of the Far East should find adequate answer in the lesson of the Quemoy crisis. That the crisis was successfully weathered is largely attributable to the superior performance and high morale of allied forces in being—trained and equipped by the Military Assistance Program.

The existence of NATO's integrated fighting forces is attributable in large part to the Military Assistance Program, and is one of its most substantial accomplishments. It is also perhaps the single strongest bulwark against Communist aggression because the NATO forces constitute the shield which protects Western Europe—an area of more than 1 million square miles, 270 million people, great resources, and a reservoir of some of the highest technical, managerial, and cultural skills of the world. The strength of that shield is very directly related to the security of the United States itself, and it must be maintained at all costs.

The total expense of supporting the common defense efforts of our free world allies through the Military Assistance Program is neither exorbitant nor an unduly onerous burden on the national economy. In the first place, in recent years military assistance expenditures have accounted for only slightly over 5 percent of total U.S. expenditures for major national security programs. Secondly, the total spent for both military and economic aid in the Mutual Security Program has accounted for less than 5 percent of our total Federal Budget in recent years, and annually has represented less than 1 percent of our Gross National Product. Because our partners in the common defense effort have shared substantially in its

financing, our own national security has been augmented at a cost far less than that of an equivalent overall increase in the strength of our own forces. Since the beginning of the collective security undertaking our allies jointly have expended from their own defense budgets almost seven times the total amount of our military assistance.

The tangible results of these expenditures, are reassuring although not a cause for complacency. Since 1950 active army forces of our allies have increased from 3,600,000 to 4,900,000 better trained and better equipped men, ready in the event of war. Combat ships assigned to the navies of the free world have more than doubled—from 1,200 to 2,500; and aircraft available for the common defense have increased from 17,000 to over 30,000. Impressive as is this numerical index of allied accomplishments, equally important—though less easily measurable—are the intangible byproducts. Chief is the strengthened self-confidence which has sprung from a more adequate defense posture. Our partners' determination to resist has become steadily firmer as they have acquired the ability to protect themselves against the threats and probing of potential aggressors. Knowing that they do not stand alone, but that the United States will collaborate with them, they have not faltered nor fallen back in times of crisis. Their staunchness warrants confidence in the future of the whole free world.

To support the Military Assistance Program adequately is therefore undeniably in the best interests of the United States; and to neglect it seriously jeopardizes those interests and our own national security. The following analysis of the status of military assistance funds clearly reveals the inevitable outcome if neglect occurs. It is an outcome we can far less easily afford than we can afford the funds necessary to insure that the Military Assistance Program will continue in full force as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

#### **Status of Military Assistance Funds**

Although the Military Assistance Program was initiated in fiscal year 1950, it was not until fiscal years 1951 and 1952, the time of the Korean crisis, that the United States began large-scale support of friendly foreign military forces to supplement the military capabilities of the United States. The military assistance appropriation for fiscal



year 1951 was \$5.223 billion and for fiscal year 1952 was \$5.267 billion. Since those years the appropriations have been gradually reduced. However, because of the long lead-time required in military procurement, the level of military assistance deliveries has remained relatively stable.

For fiscal year 1959 the Congress appropriated \$1.515 billion for military assistance. During the course of the year an additional \$15 million was provided for military assistance purposes from the President's contingency fund. Receipts from the military sales program during fiscal year 1959 totaled \$28 million. Thus additional or new funds in the amount of \$1.558 billion were made available during fiscal year 1959. That sum, plus a total of \$3.373 billion committed but not expended from prior year appropriations, provided a total of \$4.931 billion available for expenditure during fiscal year 1959. Expenditures during the

year totaled \$2.368 billion which left an unexpended balance as of June 30, 1959, of \$2.563 billion.

For fiscal year 1960 the Congress appropriated \$1.3 billion for military assistance. This smaller appropriation will result in a major reduction in the value of deliveries of goods and services that can be made in fiscal year 1960 and subsequent years. The reduced value of materials and services that will be provided to recipient forces in fiscal year 1960 will result in a slackening in the rate of improvement of the overall capability of the allied forces through postponement of planned modernization, curtailment of essential training schedules, limitation of forward planning, and in general lowering of morale. Militarily, a reduced military assistance program increases the responsibility that must be carried by U. S. forces.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During January 1960

ICEM Executive Committee: 14th Special Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 5-14
U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties: 23d Session . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 11-13
GATT Group of Experts on Temporary Admission of Professional Equipment . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 11-15
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 7th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Jan. 11-25
U.N. ECOSOC Human Rights Commission: 12th Session of Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Jan. 11-29
IAEA Board of Governors . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Jan. 12-22
GATT Panel on Antidumping Duties . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 18-22
U.N. ECE Working Group on Industrial Statistics . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 18-22
Asian National Commissions for UNESCO: Regional Meeting . .	Manila . . . . .	Jan. 18-23
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 3d Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Jan. 18-25
UNESCO Meeting on Development of Information Media in Southeast Asia . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Jan. 18-30
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Gas Problems . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 20-22
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 27-29
CENTO Scientific Council . . . . .	Tehran . . . . .	Jan. 30-31

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Jan. 13, 1960. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization.

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

### In Session as of January 31, 1960

Political Discussions on Suspension of Nuclear Tests . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 31, 1958–
U.N. ECAFE Industry and Natural Resources Committee: Seminar on Aerial Survey Methods and Equipment . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Jan. 4–
WHO Executive Board: 25th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 12–
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 12th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Jan. 23–
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 25–
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Moscow . . . . .	Jan. 25–
SEATO Preparatory Conference for Heads of Universities Seminar . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Jan. 25–
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 1st Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 25–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 25th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Jan. 25–
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 2d Session . . . . .	Tangier . . . . .	Jan. 25–
3d ICAO African-Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Jan. 26–

### Scheduled February 1 Through April 30, 1960

FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 5th Session . . . . .	New Delhi . . . . .	Feb. 8–
Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara . . . . .	Tananarive, Madagascar . . . . .	Feb. 15–
IBE Executive Board . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Feb. 15–
GATT Panel on Subsidies and State Trading . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Feb. 15–
U.N. Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: 2d Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Feb. 16–
ILO Governing Body: 144th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Feb. 17–
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 16th Session . . . . .	Karachi . . . . .	Feb. 17–
FAO Group of Experts on Rice Grading and Standardization: 5th Session . . . . .	Saigon . . . . .	Feb. 18–
FAO Consultative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice: 4th Session . . . . .	Saigon . . . . .	Feb. 22–
ICAO Special Communications Meeting on European-Mediterranean Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Feb. 23–
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting . . . . .	San José . . . . .	Feb. 23–
U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: 11th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Feb. 23–
European National Commissions for UNESCO: Regional Meeting . . . . .	Taormina, Sicily . . . . .	Feb. 23–
IMCO Ad Hoc Committee on Rules of Procedure . . . . .	London . . . . .	Feb. 26–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 16th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Feb. 29–
FAO Meeting of Government Experts on Use of Designations, Definitions, and Standards for Milk and Milk Products . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	February
IMCO Council: 3d Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Mar. 2–
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 5th Meeting of the Technical Advisory Council . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	Mar. 7–
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 7–
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 3d Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Mar. 8–
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14–
Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 15–
5th ICAO North Atlantic Ocean Stations Conference . . . . .	The Hague . . . . .	Mar. 17–
2d U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 17–
ICAO Legal Committee: Subcommittee on Aerial Collision . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 21–
ICAO Subcommittee on Hire, Charter, and Interchange . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 21–
ITU CCITT Working Party 43 (Data Transmission) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 21–
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Small-Scale Industries and Handicraft Marketing/Canning and Bottling of Fruit and Food in Cooperation with FAO . . . . .	Singapore . . . . .	Mar. 21–
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 28–
GATT Intersessional Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 28–
UNESCO Executive Board: 56th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 28–
UNESCO Meeting of Administrators on Technical and Vocational Education in Africa . . . . .	Acra . . . . .	Mar. 28–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 14th Session . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Mar. 28–
UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on Extension of Primary Education in Latin America . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	March
ICAO Informal Caribbean Regional Meeting on Meteorology . . . . .	Curaçao . . . . .	Apr. 1–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 29th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 5–
International Wheat Council: Special Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 5–
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 11th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 18–
Meeting of Experts on the Inter-American Telecommunications Network . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Apr. 19–
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 15th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 20–
ICAO Teletypewriter Panel . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Apr. 25–

ILO Petroleum Committee: 6th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 25-
U.N. ECOSOC Narcotic Drugs Commission: 15th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 25-
NATO Ministerial Council . . . . .	Istanbul . . . . .	Apr. 28-
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 3d Session.	Geneva . . . . .	April
U.N. ECOSOC Narcotic Drugs Commission: Illicit Traffic Committee.	Geneva . . . . .	April

## Tenth Anniversary of Colombo Plan

*Statement by Secretary Herter*

Press release 11 dated January 13

On behalf of the U.S. Government I wish to pay tribute to the imaginative genius of those Commonwealth ministers who, on January 14, 1950, conceived of the idea of a friendly international association which was destined to develop into the widely esteemed institution now known as the Colombo Plan.

The Colombo Plan is esteemed because its essence is a noble objective. It stimulates through friendly consultation more rapid economic development of the countries of south and southeast Asia, countries which are struggling to free themselves from the ageless burden of poverty. The United States, having undertaken numerous programs of economic cooperation through bilateral arrangements with countries of this area, was pleased to join this association of free countries shortly after its inception. Although the members extend or receive aid through bilateral arrangements, the intimate multilateral discussions among friends within the Colombo Plan system are undoubtedly of great value to all concerned. They have constituted a stimulating force and have made possible more efficient and effective fulfillment of objectives on the part of both aid-giving and aid-receiving nations.

If there is a key to the success of the Colombo Plan, I believe it may lie in the informal friendly consultative nature of its procedures. The Colombo Plan is not rigid; it does not bind members to any particular course; it is not an operating agency. It does bring friends closer in their cooperative efforts. It is an association of friendly countries and is most useful toward meeting the economic needs and national desires of the members. It has in fact become a symbol of the economic aspirations of hundreds of millions of people. My Government is proud to be a

member of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee. It is gratified that through unanimous consent the life of this organization has recently been extended. It wishes for the Colombo Plan continued success in its great mission.

## United States Delegations to International Conferences

### ECE Steel Committee

The Department of State announced on January 8 (press release 4) the designation of Howard J. Mullin, a vice president of the U.S. Steel Corp., as the U.S. Delegate to the 23d session of the Steel Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), convening at Geneva, Switzerland, on January 11, 1960.

Assisting Mr. Mullin as Alternate U.S. Delegate will be Robert D. Woodward, an economist with the Bethlehem Steel Co.

The Steel Committee is one of the principal committees of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe and provides a forum where steel experts meet periodically to consider and discuss matters of common interest. The forthcoming meeting will discuss principally the long-term trends and problems in the steel industry and a program of future work and will review the 1959 steel market.

### UNESCO Conference on Mass Communications in Southeast Asia

An eight-man U.S. delegation headed by Wilbur Schramm of Stanford University will participate in an international conference on the development of mass communications in southeast Asia, beginning January 18 at Bangkok, Thailand, the Department of State announced on January 11 (press release 6).

The 2-week meeting is the first step in a world-

wide survey of existing problems in the mass communications field being carried out by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Dr. Schramm, director of Stanford's Institute of Communication Research and an authority on mass communications, was in Washington on January 11 for talks with Department of State and other Government officials and a meeting with officials of the radio, television, and motion picture industries. Prior to leaving New York for Bangkok, he met with wire-service and other media representatives who have special interest in southeast Asia.

The remainder of the U.S. delegation will be made up of U.S. officials assigned to the southeast Asian area.

UNESCO plans similar surveys for Latin America in 1961 and for Africa in 1962.

#### **ECE Working Party on Gas Problems**

The Department of State announced on January 15 (press release 21) the designation of Hall M. Henry, president, New England Gas and Electric Association Service Corporation, Cambridge, Mass., as United States Delegate to the meeting of the Working Party on Gas Problems of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which is scheduled to be held at Geneva, January 20-22, 1960.

The main purpose of the meeting is to discuss European fuel gas problems. Mr. Henry will be assisted by a member of the United States resident delegation at Geneva.

### **Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography<sup>1</sup>**

#### **Security Council**

Letter Dated 22 December 1959 From the Permanent Representative of India Addressed to the President of the Security Council Concerning a Pakistani Letter (S/4242). S/4249. December 28, 1959. 3 pp.

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain libraries in the United States.

#### **General Assembly**

Establishment and Maintenance of a United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea. Report of the Secretary-General on the conclusion of the agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of Korea. A/4330. December 4, 1959. 10 pp.

Question of South West Africa. Letter dated December 12, 1959, from the permanent representative of the Union of South Africa addressed to the President of the General Assembly. A/4352. December 12, 1959. 2 pp.

Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1960. Report of the Fifth Committee. Corrigendum. A/4336/Corr. 1. December 12, 1959. 1 p.

#### **Economic and Social Council**

Economic Commission for Europe Working Party on Gas Problems. Report on Economic Problems of Underground Storage of Gas. E/ECE/362. August 26, 1959. 47 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Note on Measures Required for the Control of the Infectious Diseases of Livestock, Particularly Rinderpest in the North-East Region of Africa. E/CN.14/31. November 10, 1959. 4 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. International Economic Assistance to Africa: A Review of Current Contributions. Memorandum by the Executive Secretary. E/CN.14/23. November 12, 1959. 31 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Measures Needed To Ensure More Effective Control of Locusts in Africa. Executive Secretary's report on his inquiries. E/CN.14/32 and Corr. 1. November 16, 1959. 11 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Information Paper on Technical Assistance Activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Prepared by the IBRD. E/CN.14/26. November 17, 1959. 4 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Annotated Provisional Agenda. E/CN.14/22. November 18, 1959. 5 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Report by the Executive Secretary on His Exploration of Means of Aiding Governments in North Africa To Develop Their Esparto Grass Reserves. E/CN.14/33. November 18, 1959. 5 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Report by the Executive Secretary on His Exploration of Means of Aiding Governments in North Africa To Develop Their Sea Fisheries. E/CN.14/34. November 18, 1959. 7 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. The Impact of the European Economic Community on African Trade. E/CN.14/29. November 20, 1959. 31 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Information Paper on Technical Assistance Provided to Countries and Territories of the ECA Region Under the Expanded and Regular Programmes. Prepared by the TAB secretariat. E/CN.14/27. December 1, 1959. 31 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Programme of Work and Priorities 1960 and 1961. Memorandum by the Executive Secretary. E/CN.14/36. December 1, 1959. 21 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Information Paper on UNICEF Aid to Child Health and Welfare Projects in Africa. Prepared by the United Nations Children's Fund. E/CN.14/41. December 4, 1959. 12 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Report on the Facilities Available for the Training of Africans in Economics, Statistics and Related Fields of Study. Prepared by UNESCO. E/CN.14/35 and Add. 1. December 7, 1959. 95 pp.

Commission on the Status of Women. Women in Public Services and Functions. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/354. December 8, 1959. 75 pp.

Technical Assistance. Report of the Technical Assistance Committee. E/3312. December 9, 1959. 22 pp.



## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Sugar

International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force provisionally January 1, 1959; definitively for the United States October 9, 1959.

*Ratifications deposited:* Guatemala, December 11, 1959; Ghana, March 4, 1959; Panama, March 18, 1959.

##### Telecommunication

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960.

*Notification of approval:* Sweden, November 18, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

##### Trade and Commerce

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures:* Ceylon, October 31, 1959; the United Kingdom, November 6, 1959; Federation of Malaya and Peru, November 16, 1959.

#### BILATERAL

##### Argentina

Agreement relating to investment guaranties under section 413(b)(4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 847; 22 U.S.C. 1933). Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1959. Entered into force provisionally December 22, 1959; enters into force definitively on the date of receipt of a note by the United States stating the agreement has been approved by Argentina in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

##### Belgium

Agreement concerning American military cemeteries, with annex. Signed at Brussels November 27, 1959. Entered into force November 27, 1959.

Agreement regarding the erection of certain memorials in Belgium by the American Battle Monuments Commission. Signed at Paris October 4, 1929 (46 Stat. 2732). *Terminated:* November 27, 1959, by agreement concerning American military cemeteries (*supra*).

Agreement relating to the interment of American nationals in Belgium, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels June 6 and July 23, 1947 (TIAS 1672, 1969, and 3239).

*Terminated:* November 27, 1959, by agreement concerning American military cemeteries (*supra*).

##### Haiti

Agreement for the exchange of third-party messages between radio amateurs of the United States and Haiti.

<sup>1</sup> With a reservation.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince January 4 and 6, 1960. Entered into force January 6, 1960.

##### India

Agreement further supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of November 13, 1959, as supplemented (TIAS 4354). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 8, 1960. Entered into force January 8, 1960.

##### Israel

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with agreed minute. Signed at Washington January 7, 1960. Entered into force January 7, 1960.

##### Italy

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of June 28, 1954 (TIAS 3150), with Italy for a technical cooperation program for the Trust Territory of Somaliland. Effected by exchange of letters at Rome December 24, 1959. Entered into force December 24, 1959.

##### Turkey

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Ankara December 22, 1959. Entered into force December 22, 1959.

##### Venezuela

Arrangement for exchange of communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas November 12, 1959. Entered into force November 12, 1959; operative December 12, 1959.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### ICA Institute Opens Fourth Session

The Department of State announced on January 11 (press release 8) that the International Cooperation Administration on that day had opened the fourth in its series of institutes in program planning for selected ICA employees. The 5-month course is conducted for ICA at Washington by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Nineteen ICA staff members are attending the institute.

The training is designed to improve the participants' effectiveness in dealing with complex technical and economic problems in countries to which they will be assigned. The principles of economic development, including the role of the Mutual Security Program as well as the relationship of political and cultural factors, are included in the curriculum. Lecture courses are given by the Johns Hopkins faculty and by guest lecturers from other universities, international institutions, and U.S. Government agencies.

## Post at Yaoundé, Cameroun, Raised to Embassy

The Department of State announced on January 5 (press release 1) that the American consulate general at Yaoundé, Cameroun, was elevated to an Embassy on January 1, 1960, upon formal attainment of independence by the former United Nations trust territory under French administration. Cameroun obtained its independence as a result of a resolution of the United Nations resumed 13th General Assembly passed on March 13, 1959,<sup>1</sup> declaring that the trusteeship agreement would cease to be in force on January 1.

The United States first opened a consulate at Yaoundé in June 1957. This was raised to a consulate general on April 10, 1959.

Bolard More has been named Chargé d'Affaires.

## Recess Appointments

The President on January 4 appointed Dennis A. Fitzgerald to be Deputy Director for Operations of the International Cooperation Administration in the Department of State.

## Designations

Edwin McCammon Martin as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective January 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 14 dated January 1.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

**You and Your Passport.** Pub. 6828. Department and Foreign Service Series 88. 10 pp. 5¢.

A leaflet containing information of interest to any person who plans to go abroad.

**The Biographic Register, 1959.** Pub. 6838. Department and Foreign Service Series 89. 804 pp. \$4.50.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1349 (XIII); for text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 13, 1959, p. 534.

A publication containing biographies for certain employees of the Department of State, the United States Mission to the United Nations, the International Cooperation Administration, and the United States Information Agency. Biographies are included also for the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture.

**Southeast Asia: Area of Challenge, Change, and Progress.** Pub. 6861. Far Eastern Series 82. 15 pp. 15¢.

Another issue in the popular *Background* series, this pamphlet discusses the importance, land, peoples, economic situation, and individual countries of the area.

**Your Department of State.** Pub. 6877. Department and Foreign Service Series 91. 14 pp. 15¢.

An illustrated pamphlet describing the origin, functions, organization, and principal officers of the Department; a revision of the original pamphlet.

**Cultural Diplomacy.** Pub. 6887. International Information and Cultural Series 70. 50 pp. 25¢.

An illustrated publication which helps to describe the important role cultural diplomacy is playing in our relations with other countries. It reviews the many kinds of exchange activities carried out under the International Educational Exchange Program during fiscal year 1958.

**How Foreign Policy Is Made.** Pub. 6892. General Foreign Policy Series 143. 20 pp. 10¢.

A revised pamphlet containing a series of questions and answers on the formulation of our foreign policy.

**International Educational Exchange Program—July 1-December 31, 1958.** Pub. 6893. International Information and Cultural Series 71. 14 pp. Limited distribution.

The 22d semiannual report to Congress describing the many kinds of exchange activities carried out during the first half of fiscal year 1959.

**Technical Cooperation—Joint Fund Program.** TIAS 4334. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Israel, amending agreement of May 9, 1952, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv June 26, 1959, and at Jerusalem September 24, 1959. Entered into force September 24, 1959.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4335. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreements between the United States of America and Indonesia, amending agreement of May 29, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta October 1, 1959. Entered into force October 1, 1959.

**Air Transport Services.** TIAS 4336. 8 pp. 10¢. Agreement between the United States of America and France, extending and amending agreement of March 27, 1946, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Paris August 27, 1959. Entered into force August 27, 1959. And extension agreement. Exchange of notes—Dated at Paris July 23, 1959. Entered into force July 23, 1959.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4337. 13 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá October 6, 1959. Entered into force October 6, 1959.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4338. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and India, amending agreements of August 29, 1956, as amended, June 23, 1958, and September 26, 1958. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 1 and 28, 1959. Entered into force October 28, 1959.

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- | No. | Date | Subject   |
|-----|------|---|
| 6   | 1/11 | Delegation to conference on mass communications (rewrite).                              |
| 7   | 1/11 | Cuban property seizures.  |
| 8   | 1/11 | ICA Institute.  |
| *9  | 1/11 | Death of George Perkins.  |
| *10 | 1/12 | Itinerary for visit of Premier Kishi.   |
| 11  | 1/13 | Herter: Colombo Plan 10th anniversary.  |
| *12 | 1/12 | 16th semiannual MSP report.   |
| 13  | 1/14 | Dillon: Special Economic Committee, Paris.  |
| *14 | 1/14 | Martin designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details). |
| *15 | 1/14 | Thompson nominated ambassador to Iceland (biographic details).                          |
| *16 | 1/14 | Reinhardt nominated ambassador to Yemen (biographic details).                           |
| 17  | 1/15 | Bulgaria credentials (rewrite).   |
| 18  | 1/15 | Reregistration of title and mining concession rights in Cuba.                           |
| 19  | 1/15 | Dillon: OEEC, Paris.  |
| 20  | 1/15 | Economic resolutions, Paris.  |
| 21  | 1/15 | Delegate to ECE working party on gas problems (rewrite).                                |
| 22  | 1/16 | Dillon: arrival at Washington from Paris meetings.                                      |
| †23 | 1/17 | Nixon: welcome to Premier Kishi.  |

\*Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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